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Health Care in Colombia, c. 1920-C.1950: 
A Preliminary Analysis 
Health care is seldom studied by historians of contemporary Latin America. 
Issues of death and disease have been the subject of both fruitful debate and 
fruitless polemic among students of the colonial period.1 Most research into 
Colombian health care in the twentieth century has been conducted by social 
scientists and public health specialists with very specific foci: social 
anthropologists have investigated such themes as indigenous healing and 
curing practices among Amerindians and the beliefs and attitudes of rural-
urban migrants regarding illness and disease;2 economists have enquired into 
topics such as the fiscal ramifications of institutional provision and the impact 
of the debt crises and adjustment programmes upon the size, distribution and 
efficacy of health spending;3 and public health specialists have pioneered 
studies of subjects ranging from the extension of primary health care in the 
countryside and the urban slums and shanty-towns to parasitical diseases 
among children in zones of tropical agriculture and the problems of the 
elderly.4 These writings have done much to enrich understanding, but have 
been conspicuous for two omissions which the contemporary historian can 
help to rectify. One is an'integrated view of health care, relating processes 
at the national level to external influences and central initiative to regional 
and local variations; the other is a long-term perspective that is sensitive to 
the cumulative significance of small shifts, both advances and reversals.5 
The aim of this project is to examine the period from c. 1920 to the late 
1980s, placing transitions in health care within their political, socio-economic 
and demographic framework. This project would be unmanageable in 
countries of the size and complexity of Brazil and Mexico, but is feasible in 
a country of intermediate rank like Colombia.6 The objective of this 
preliminary paper is to outline themes that merit close examination for the 
decades between c. 1920 and c. 1950. The author has, however, departed 
from his prescribed period more often than he might prefer, because this is 
a subject upon which some themes can be rendered intelligible only by 
reference to earlier experience. 
Periodisation is especially difficult in the study of this subject. No sharp 
chronological subdivisions that give shape and interpretative value to 
historical analysis can be identified in health care. Sequences of small, 
sometimes significant shifts, punctuated by reversals, can be observed. Few 
of these were nationwide in impact. Thus the choice of the years c. 1920 - c. 
1950 is to some extent arbitrary, though it is more than a matter of mere 
chronological convenience. During these decades there was growing 
confidence in Colombia that, in spite of the crises of the World Depression, 
the Second World War and la violencia, problems of disease could be more 
effectively combated. The state was acquiring greater competence; and 
Colombia enjoyed continuous civilian rule. Major advances were taking place 
in 'tropical' medicine, and the numbers of qualified medical and paramedical 
personnel were rising significantly. The range and quality of advice from 
international agencies, both philanthropic and official, expanded 
considerably. Articulate elements in the middle class and organised labour 
were alert to the desirability of both an active policy in public hygiene and 
sanitation and education in health and nutrition. Meanwhile, Colombia, a 
Latin American latecomer to insertion within the international economy, 
enjoyed from the early 1920s the advantages and disadvantages of an 
increasingly thorough incorporation via the coffee export sector. In the realm 
of health, these were seen in trends to modernise professional education and 
practice, especially through the exposure of individuals to specialist study 
abroad; in an emphasis upon improving sanitary conditions, notably in the sea 
and river ports, that was intended to remove obstacles to movements in 
international trade; and in the first campaigns to control disease like tropical 
anaemia (uncinariasis - hookworm) that reduced the quality of life and the 
productivity of the workforce. 
By about 1950 Colombia was irreversibly inserted into the world economy. 
Several transitions were occurring simultaneously. An overwhelmingly rural 
country was soon to become mainly urban. A sparsely populated country 
where entrepreneurs lamented a labour scarcity was about to experience the 
'demographic explosion'. (It should be added that in 1950 there was hardly 
a premonition of the impending population explosion, even less a precise 
apprehension of its gravity.) Patterns of mortality and morbidity were 
altering significantly. Whereas in the 1920s diseases associated with infancy, 
childhood and malnutrition constituted a permanent scourge in all regions, 
and 'tropical' diseases that killed, maimed and debilitated were either 
endemic or recurrently epidemic in the lowlands, by 1950 the epidemiological 
profile was even more complex than before. On the one hand, urbanisation, 
industrialisation, the beginnings of modern agribusiness, new patterns of 
internal migration and the opening up and consolidation of new rural frontiers 
gave rise to unforeseen environmental and occupational hazards and diseases. 
On the other hand, economic growth financed a significant expansion of 
incomes and improvements in nutrition and sanitation that extended life 
expectancy. The mortality profile adapted correspondingly to include 
chronic, degenerative and cardiovascular conditions principally among the 
steadily growing elderly population. At mid-century Colombians were 
experiencing the genesis of a modern social security system, the impact of 
incipient transnational pharmaceutical enterprise and changes in patterns of 
.social stratification that had profound consequences for popular expectations 
regarding family size, the quality of life and the possibility of reaching an old 
age. 
Recent historiography of social policy, especially in the spheres of 
primary, secondary and technical education, has drawn attention to the 
fragmentation of social policy and the extent to which policy was determined 
by crisis management.7 Health care was no exception to the generalisation 
that after 1930 a pragmatic openness to experimentation and continuity in 
policy were vitiated by personnel changes which hampered the evolution of 
carefully formulated policy. A formal commitment to a broadening of the 
social responsibilities of the state was written into the amended constitution 
of 1936, was enshrined in progressive legislation in areas like minimum 
standards of hygiene and safety at the workplace, and was later embodied in 
agreements with international organisations such as the ILO.8 Yet recurring 
political and fiscal crises and a high turnover of social policy ministers often 
narrowed the scope of initiative to the implementation of the modest pet 
projects of senior personnel; and in important areas routine bureaucratic 
practice prevailed. In many respects, especially at departmental level, the 
state in health care was, as elsewhere, the junior partner of private and 
philanthropic initiative; in some spheres it was the referee and arbiter, 
establishing norms and dispensing advice; in few was the state decisive. Thus 
leadership was delegated to professional leaders, to Catholic and secular 
charitable organisations which operated hospitals and orphanages, to 
progressive enterprises owned by foreigners and nationals which undertook 
experiments in company-administered health care provision, and to external 
agencies, like the International Health Board (IHB) of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. From the 1920s the IHB undertook campaigns against 
specifically 'targeted' diseases and encouraged the modernisation of public 
health laboratories to manufacture serums and vaccines. In the 1940s it 
helped to found the first professional nursing school. 
Private consultancy enjoyed more prestige than public hygiene and 
sanitation; medical education in the public sector trained graduate doctors for 
private consultancy and specialist surgery; and legislative changes in 
professional training and practice were often the consequence of private 
pressures to enhance professional esteem. By interest, education, family and 
connection the professional elite in medicine formed part of a relatively 
unified propertied elite which opted for civilian rule and gradualism, and 
which assured the partial satisfaction of the ambitions of intermediate social 
strata while aiming to contain and, at intervals, to suppress the demands of 
the peasantry and urban and rural labour. The medical establishment put up 
few obstacles to the professionalisation of pharmacy, nursing and sanitary 
engineering, so long as its own interests and prestige were not jeopardised. 
Pragmatic in their approach to policy, professional leaders encouraged 
enlightened experiments where these enhanced their reputation and could be 
argued to be in the public interest. Professional leaders publicly lamented the 
low priority attached to health policy. Only during crises - epidemics, war 
against Peru and insurrection (the bogotazo of 9 April 1948) - did health 
issues temporarily acquire a high priority. Crisis revealed the urgency of an 
administrative overhaul that could not be undertaken while resources were 
overstretched by the crisis itself. A professional awareness of the gravity of 
inherited problems was not matched by the political will and competence or 
the funds to confront them. 
The nature of popular pressures is still unclear: how far popular classes 
opting for the attention of popular practitioners resisted the influences of 
more and more medical and paramedical professionals on the grounds that 
they formed part of a pattern of advancing elite domination that disrupted 
popular culture; how far the popular classes accommodated change from 
above where it occurred, mainly in the cities; and how far they pressed in 
their own interests for change to be accelerated and access to its benefits 
made more general. Prima facie evidence suggests some shifts between these 
positions that was consistent with a growth in awareness of the benefits of 
'modern' health care combined with a defensive adherence to tested methods. 
The pattern of change in health care was thus consonant with other broader 
patterns in Colombia. Before the 1960s there was little expectation of radical 
change and more experience of slow improvements punctuated by frustrating 
setbacks. 
This paper places a particular stress on the role of the state and the 
evolution of the medical and, to a lesser extent, the paramedical professions. 
It is written on three assumptions. First, the evolution of health care is to be 
understood in terms of the relationship between domestic change and external 
pressures, between the private, philanthropic and public sectors, and between 
those processes specific to the health care sector and those (like incomes and 
growth) exogenous to it. Secondly, comparative data from other countries, 
both 'developed' and 'underdeveloped', is useful to clarify some aspects of 
an unfamiliar subject. Thirdly, nothing is to be gained from a re-cycling of 
the ageing polemic played out in other areas of the historiography between 
the champions of the study of 'great men' and scientific breakthroughs and 
the advocates of the study of the connections between the health care sector 
and its broader political and socio-economic environment. The range of data 
available for health care changes significantly over the three decades 
considered here. In the early 1920s statistical data, even basic indicators for 
mortality and morbidity, were sparse and unreliable. By the early 1950s there 
was a clear sense within central government that impressionistic evidence was 
insufficient to formulate effective policy, and some effort was made to collect 
and generate data based on the first 'modern' censuses of 1938 and 1951. 
Qualitative data, some of which is used here, is accessible in public 
legislation, policy documents (both national and departmental), professional 
periodicals and other specialist publications, the reports of international 
agencies, the press and elsewhere. Some of the writings of the minority of 
physicians who pursue the history of medicine as an amateur interest are 
useful. Various of the participants in the processes of the 1930s and 1940s 
remain alive and available for interview. 
Disease and the Epidemiological Profile 
During the nineteenth century disease impeded the consolidation of the 
national market and political integration. Endemic and recurrent disease in 
the lowlands posed obstacles to introducing transport improvements and also 
to travelling by existing routes. Disease deterred immigration from overseas 
and internal migrations, especially between the relatively salubrious uplands 
and the disease-ridden lowlands. (Indeed, modern epidemiological theory 
indicates that adults moving to a new disease environment suffer a lack of 
immunities.) The complexity of the Colombian topography was parallelled 
by the complexity of her epidemiological profile. Given the lack of 
salubriousness of the environment, epidemic was commonplace in the 
nineteenth century but tended also to be localised and therefore containable. 
From the 1880s and 1890s Colombian medical practitioners shared in a 
growth of international knowledge of preventive hygienic measures that were 
practical in the struggle against particular diseases. 
In the present state of research no confident statistical picture of epidemics 
and mortality for the 1920s can be supplied. Yellow fever, which, according 
to Humboldt, appeared at all altitudes below 2,500 feet, posed grave 
problems.9 Outbreaks of epidemic proportions had been recorded in the 
Caribbean coast region since the eighteenth century: in Cartagena in 1804 and 
again in 1815, in Barranquilla in 1871, and in Cienaga and Riohacha in 1904. 
The last cases of the illness were recorded in 1906 in Santa Marta and in 
1912 in Cartagena and Barranquilla. In the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century yellow fever had posed a serious obstacle to the French inter-oceanic 
canal project in the Panamanian isthmus (before the secession, with US 
backing, of Panama from Colombia). The growth of river traffic in the 
Magdalena Valley and the beginnings of new settlements associated with 
tobacco cultivation provided scope for several outbreaks of yellow fever in 
the interior lowlands: in Honda and Ambalema (1823), Mompos (1856), 
Girardot (1865), Penaliza (1866), Espinal (1880), Tocaima (1884) and 
Guaduas (1885). Other epidemics occurred in the north-east, near the 
Venezuelan frontier, in the Valley of Cucuta between 1880 and 1888. Five 
municipalities of Santander, including Bucaramanga, were subject to an 
epidemic between 1910 and 1912. Experience in the British Caribbean 
colonies indicated the difficulties of escaping from yellow fever: some of the 
British troops who took refuge from an epidemic in Jamaica in 1867-8 by 
moving to the hill stations carried the virus in their blood, where it lived 
perfectly well as long as the temperature remained above freezing.10 
Mosquito-borne transmission of yellow fever was established in 1881 by 
the Cuban medical scientist, Carlos Finlay. The vector Aedes aegypti that 
transmitted infection in urban environments, inhabiting housing and 
incubating in stagnant water, had flourished in the confusion of the Second 
Cuban War of Independence (1895-8). Thus the Yellow Fever Commission 
in Havana during the first US occupation (1898-1902) pioneered campaigning 
measures to control the vector of the Aedes aegypti. Aiming to protect US 
military and civilian personnel, to attract US investment and trade, to placate 
Cuban critics of the occupation regime and to forestall the spread of epidemic 
yellow fever by ship to the ports of North America, the Yellow Fever 
Commission applied its measures so rigorously that not one case was 
recorded in Cuba in 1902.11 In 1923 practices well tried in Cuba, Panama, 
New Orleans and elsewhere were applied in Colombia as a second epidemic 
caused loss of life in Bucaramanga. The last urban epidemic in Colombia 
occurred in 1929 in El Socorro, Santander, with 34 deaths among 150 
recorded cases in an urban population of about six thousand.12 Urban yellow 
fever ceased to be a scourge. 
Smallpox was another major killer. It was subject to classic epidemic 
swings, by which one generation which survived an epidemic enjoyed a 
degree of immunity not shared by the next generation which in turn was 
victim to the reappearance of the disease. In spite of the gravity of the 
smallpox epidemic of 1803-5 the first moves to confront it had met with both 
political resistance on financial grounds from the Cabildo of Santa Fe de 
Bogota and popular indifference, problems that were exacerbated by a 
problem of damaged vaccine that made innoculation rather than vaccination 
necessary.13 
The humid isothermal lowlands proved an ideal medium for the 
propagation of malaria, which prospered when flooding occurred and 
mosquitoes proliferated. The greatest virulence of malaria was recorded after 
the draining of forests. Recurrent flooding meant a recurrent problem of 
malaria among the populations of mixed race in Uraba, the Magdalena and 
Cauca Valleys, the Guajira Indians and, especially, the poor blacks of the 
Atrato Valley. According to James J. Parsons, the Antioqueno homesteaders 
of the late nineteenth century on the Caldas and Tolima frontier 
acknowledged the risk of malaria in the lowlands by building new settlements 
in high, well-ventilated ridge sites generally at an altitude above the 
anopheles belt.14 Tackling malaria was exceptionally difficult. On the one 
hand, Colombia enjoyed easy access to supplies of the established 
prophylaxis against malaria, quinine, which Joseph Pelletier and Joseph 
Caventou had isolated, with other antimalarial alkaloids, from cinchona bark 
in 1820. (They had also isolated emetine from the Brazilian root, the 
ipecacuanha, which was extensively used as an emetic and, in modified form, 
as an antidysenteric.) On the other hand, mosquito control by drainage of 
swamps, the clearing of undergrowth, the protection of water deposits and 
the spreading of larvicides over stagnant water was a costly and 
administratively complex matter which involved several distinct regions. 
Gradually foreign and upper class travellers became accustomed to the use 
of mosquito nets and screened accommodation along the lines introduced by 
the US occupation forces in Cuba, Puerto Rico and Panama; and they became 
careful to choose mosquito-free sleeping quarters. Yet campaigns against the 
anopheline genus (undertaken in Colombia in particular in the mid-1930s) had 
none of the permanent success of the campaign against urban yellow fever. 
Hookworm, an iron-deficiency anaemia, was the main intestinal parasitical 
disease associated with the coffee-producing zones. Poor sanitary conditions 
- usually the complete absence of modern lavatories - and rotting pulp from 
coffee berries contributed to infection. Larvae penetrated the bloodstream 
through uncovered hands and the shoeless feet of workers and their children, 
giving rise to permanent lesions, blisters and sores along with swellings of 
the legs. Intestinal parasites were little tackled by 1920, not least because 
they caused few deaths perse. Their greatest impact was in debilitating rural 
populations, reducing their capacity for work and their quality of life, and 
weakening them so as to increase their vulnerability to killer diseases. A high 
incidence of intestinal parasites was not surprising, given the proportion of 
rural homes with dirtfloors. 
Children were especially subject to mortality through gastrointestinal 
diseases (diarrhoea, gastritis, enteritis) in coffee and non-coffee producing 
areas of high bacteria counts caused by poor environmental sanitation, and 
were especially vulnerable where they suffered malnutrition, in particular a 
low protein intake. A stress on practices of breastfeeding and milk 
pasteurisation which reduced risk was barely visible until the early 1920s. 
Baby and infant mortality from tetanus neonatorum caused by umbilical 
sepsis resulting from the custom of placing cowdung on the healing umbilical 
scar was widespread. It was perhaps reduced by the slow expansion of 
hospitalisation for childbirth during the inter-war period. 
Leprosy posed other problems. There was no evidence that it was a major 
killer; but there persisted the attitude founded in biblical precedent that 
leprosy constituted a divine punishment. The exponents of this orthodoxy 
demanded the segregation of lepers to colonies remote from the remainder of 
society, including the victims of other diseases. Thus leper colonies were 
founded at Agua de Dios in Tolima (1870), Contratacion in Santander and 
Cano de Loro near Cartagena. At Agua de Dios lepers were attended from 
1891 by Italian and Dutch Salesians, and also by nuns from the orders of La 
Presentation and the Sacred Heart. The colonies were supported by the 
charitable societies of St. Lazarus. Enlightened members of the Academia 
Nacional de Medicina argued strongly in 1892 against official proposals to 
create a leper colony on the deserted island of Coiba off the Panamanian 
coast, and in 1928 argued again that the obligatory isolation of leprosy 
victims in three colonies was deplorable. Lepers, they contended, should be 
placed at liberty, enjoying access to a dispensary in an isolation hospital at 
Bogota, which would also serve as a centre for the study of Hansen's 
bacillus. But enlightened academicians who believed that the aim of policy 
should be the reintegration of sufferers from leprosy into society, not 
punitive ostracism and cruel outcast treatment, were defeated by public 
opinion and private interests in spite of the burden upon the exchequer 
represented by the colonies.15 
Other diseases, notably venereal diseases and tuberculosis, were associated 
with steady urbanisation in the early decades of the twentieth century and, in 
the case of tuberculosis, poor nutrition from childhood, and overcrowding 
and lack of cleanliness at home and the workplace. A lack of vigilance 
regarding tuberculosis was always a risk, since it was still commonly 
believed by physicians that tuberculosis was less deadly in the tropics than in 
Europe. Typhoid posed great problems, which were slowly overcome by 
modern sanitary engineering in the cities. But in the absence of sanitary 
knowledge regarding the disposal of human excrement and the washing of 
clothes, drinking water was frequently fouled. Consumption of filthy water 
was probably the most common cause of infection in some coffee 
municipalities. 
Colombians suffered too from diseases known to the New World that had 
proved unexportable to the Old: verruga peruana (often known in the 
English-speaking world by its Spanish name but otherwise referred to as 
bartonellosis), whose main symptoms were great ulcers, which was known 
only in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador; oroya fever, which strikes only in 
Andean countries; Chagas' disease, which can sometimes be fatal; and the 
skin disease, pinta, which, according to Crosby, has never crossed oceans, 
unless it is considered as merely another form of treponematosis.16 
Death from infectious diseases was commonplace and only slowly 
displaced by a trend towards death by degenerative diseases. After 1945, as 
incomes rose and urbanisation took place on a massive scale, the volume of 
food staples expanded and the quality of diet tended to improve. Significant 
improvements in housing and sanitation occurred, along with an expansion 
in access to a steadily growing range of modern medicines and public health 
facilities. Life expectancy rose as higher literacy rates and more frequent 
health education campaigns made an impact. At the same time more 
efficacious disease-fighting measures were applied. And a better popular 
appreciation of the causes and consequences of such infectious and 
communicable diseases as measles and whooping cough was acknowledged. 
The Evolution of Science, the Medical Profession and 
Popular Alternatives from Mutis to 1930 
Colombia enjoyed a slender but significant tradition in medical education, 
scientific inquiry and public health innovation. Several generations of 
physicians spun a heroic myth around the main protagonist of scientific 
change, Jose Celestino Mutis, who arrived as a member of the Botanical 
Expeditions sent to New Granada by Charles III to identify, classify and 
investigate the properties of medicinal plants.17 Mutis and his team 
composed a de facto faculty of the natural sciences in which many Creoles 
were trained.18 Mutis was (and is still) venerated as the founding-father of 
modern science and medicine in Colombia, admired as a symbol of public 
spiritedness combined with a determined demy stification of stale orthodoxies, 
and invoked as a reference-point for new entrants to the medical profession. 
Mutis played a vital role in the struggle of enlightened intellectuals against 
the status quo; used his considerable influence to press for the modernisation 
of medical education; was active in advancing the study of botany; and 
pressed for changes in policy on public hygiene and sanitation. He was 
remembered for his conscientious assimilation of European examples to the 
circumstances of New Granada, and also for his determination to transmit to 
the colony a complete digest of current scientific ideas, rendering them 
comprehensible without distorting them by oversimplification. Thanks largely 
to Mutis and Alexander Von Humboldt, New Granada shared in scientific 
debates raging in Europe at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
With Miguel de la Isla, Mutis revised the medical curriculum. Their Plan 
General de los Estudios Medicos, devised in Bogota, which appeared in a 
preliminary draft in 1802 and in its definitive version in 1805, embodied 
Mutis's advocacy of practical training as well as theoretical studies in 
medical education. Containing features derived from both the Spanish and 
French Enlightenments, the Plan General stressed surgery in the curriculum 
at a time when this was available in only three colegios de cirugia in Spain 
itself (Cadiz, Barcelona and Madrid). For Mutis it was essential that the 
curricula of study be carefully defined and thoroughly enforced, and that they 
should embody best current practice, combining clinical studies linked to the 
teaching of mathematics and natural sciences with theory. He was equally 
unyielding in pressing for the professional exercise of medicine to be 
regulated effectively, and for the system of examining of practitioners to be 
controlled. Forceful in stressing the urgency of establishing a chair as the 
first stage to the solution of immediate public health needs in Bogota, Mutis 
envisaged the establishment of further chairs in areas like anatomy and 
clinical and botanical medicine. Careful not to underestimate the resources 
of talent in New Granada, Mutis rejected the argument that medical 
professors should be dispatched from Spain to Santa Fe de Bogota, and 
argued that local educators had the competence to reform medical education. 
While emphatic about the need for medical practice to be regulated within a 
judicial framework and for a system of professional recognition, Mutis was 
at the same time pragmatic in acknowledging that popular curers 
(curanderos) and midwives (parteras) performed an important role so long 
as there were insufficient medical practitioners to attend to the needs of the 
entire population. He did not condemn outright surgeon-barbers of humble 
social origins who had no theoretical knowledge, arguing instead that some 
cirujanos-romancistas that he had seen did a good job.19 
Mutis was recalled too as a champion of experimental Newtonian science, 
Copernicus, Galileo and the heliocentric theory against the sterile and 
obscurantist scholasticism of the Dominican Thomists. He was admired as the 
most eminent of the nucleus of scientists identified with enlightened learning 
at the Patriotic Society, as well as with revolutionary Creole agitation and 
resistance to peninsular oppression, especially the decision to dismantle the 
Botanical Expedition.20 Like Alexander Von Humboldt, Mutis symbolised 
a dedication to systematic recording and observation, that included the 
collection of quantitative data;21 and he enquired conscientiously into the use 
of vegetable oils and resins in the struggle against endemic diseases and the 
properties of quinine and its uses against malaria. The first scientific 
publication in New Granada following the arrival of the printing-press was 
the work of Mutis, Metodopara curar las viruelas, in which he examined the 
impact of high altitudes on human organs, and reviewed vaccination practices 
and diagnosed the relationship between variations in temperature and wind 
direction and trends in illnesses. Mutis, however, was not only the 
disinterested scientist: alert to the politico-religious environment, he 
interpreted the smallpox epidemic following the comunero revolt of 1781 as 
divine retribution. 
Mutis stood out as an advocate of prudent rationality while reforming 
Crown bureaucracies were active. Observing that economic growth could be 
achieved only if the population grew faster, and by implication, if the death 
rate were reduced by effective measures to counter epidemics, reforming 
bureaucrats attempted to found a military hospital. Mutis acted as spokesman 
for a rational organisation of sanitary and hygienic services to support the 
military. Meanwhile, colonial administrators attempted to reassert Crown 
control over the finances and administration of hospitals, leaving only patient 
care to the religious orders.22 Most important among public health initiatives 
were the early attempts by Francisco Salvany to vaccinate children against 
smallpox in 1803. Salvany, assistant of Francisco Javier de Bulmis, who led 
an official expedition to vaccinate the populations of Puerto Rico and 
Caracas, followed the procedures that Edward Jenner recommended after 
making the first experimental vaccine in 1795. 
During the century after Mutis, scientific inquiry, medical education and 
public health policy were subject to cycles of initiative and setback associated 
both with civil wars and disturbances and with uncertainties of funding before 
the ascendancy of the coffee export sector was assured. Circumstances were 
inimical to scientific inquiry: material resources (hospitals, equipment, etc) 
were destroyed and expertise (practitioners, professors, students) was 
dispersed. The small number of physicians who tried to sustain the 
investigative traditions of Mutis, to enlarge the profession and raise its 
competence, to expose Colombia to the genesis of modern medical science 
and to make some informal medical services available to the destitute, are 
recalled in the professional literature as titans in a heroic struggle against 
ignorance and chaos and as medicos-apostoles and prototipos de caridadP 
But espafiolismo - a convenient shorthand for obsolete practices - was slow 
to die. 
Although Bolivar had invited a French chemist, Jean-Baptiste 
Boussingault, to undertake studies of the chemistry of plants, further research 
into their locations and the collection of data and systematic information on 
their appearance, medical properties and economic uses were little developed 
before the inter-war period, mainly for lack of resources to establish research 
laboratories. One exceptional Colombian botanist, Jose Jeronimo Triana, who 
aimed to show European audiences the medical and economic value of 
Colombian plants, made a thorough collection of species and mailed large 
quantities of specimens to Europe, sending a monograph together with a 
collection of 6,000 plants for the International Exposition in Paris in 1867?4 
One maverick Colombian researcher investigated medical geography and, in 
particular, the poison niarra in the Uraba region in the late 1910s. Such 
scientific endeavours were unique, and, in Colombia, regarded as eccentric. 
Only when the National Herbarium was founded at the end of the 1920s was 
an impetus given to continuous and systematic research; and samples of the 
rich diversity of plants emanating from contrasting Colombian habitats - the 
Andean highlands, Amazon rainforest, tropical valleys, etc. - were collected. 
Ethnopharmacological investigations followed slowly.25 
The early decades of the nineteenth century witnessed some institutional 
innovation in medical education. The foundation in Bogota of the Escuela 
Medica by Isla and Gil de Tejada in 1810 and of the Academia de Medicina 
in 1817 constituted important landmarks. There followed the decisions of 
Santander to open the Universidad Nacional in 1826 and the Facultad de 
Medicina in 1827. An adaptation of a French hygiene text was then published 
in 1828. In mid-century a new wave of liberal reform gave a further impetus 
to medical education. The Plan of Studies of 1868 reflected a clear attempt 
to locate Colombian medical education within the vanguard of European 
practice while adapting it to Colombian needs and incorporating specifically 
national features into the curriculum. The reform of the university in 1867 
and the opening of a School of Medicine in 1868 stimulated a vital debate 
about curriculum content. In the first three years of training students 
encountered a heavy stress upon pathology and anatomy and were introduced 
to pharmacy and operative medicine; and in their fourth they attended three 
courses, one each on obstetrics and 'special pathology of women and 
children', on public hygiene (general and Colombian) and private hygiene, 
and on forensic science. Theoretical courses were complemented by 
practicals in which students accompanied the professor on hospital visits and 
took part in minor operations. In the 1890s a thesis was added to 
requirements for students.26 
Medical education was subject to serious setbacks. Recurrent warfare 
destroyed buildings and equipment, dislocated the professorial body and 
disrupted the careers of students. As in France between 1792 and 1794, 
medical practice was deregulated, medical education disturbed and inhibitions 
upon empirics removed, by one Radical government in the mid-nineteenth 
century.27 The steady evolution of medical education was obstructed even 
by small but significant difficulties like shortages of cadavers for anatomical 
dissection.28 Sometimes the national syllabus was ahead of the institutional 
framework. Although, for example, paediatrics was a recognised part of the 
curriculum from the late 1860s, only in 1906 was a pediatric hospital, the 
Hospital de la Misericordia, inspired by the London-trained Jose Ignacio 
Barberi, opened in Bogota. Its foundation reflected the emulation in 
Colombia of French and British trends towards medical specialisation. A 
struggle for intellectual recognition of a specialism could be resolved by the 
return of a specialist trained in Paris, but the struggle for its place in the 
syllabus could last a decade. Thus, to take one example, competition for a 
place in the curriculum meant the relegation of clinical studies in infant 
medicine to an optional subject, vying for student attention with clinical 
studies of the senses or clinical studies of dermatology and syphilis.29 
A trickle of immigrant physicians and surgeons - British, French, Spanish, 
Swedish and Virginian, lured by the fresh air of liberty and independence and 
the pursuit of professional success - brought both competent men and 
charlatans.30 Some were military surgeons with the British Legion, others 
worked at the mines of Marmato, and others still received short-term 
government contracts on scientific missions. The case of Ninian Richard 
Cheyne exemplified a general pattern. Cheyne, a Scot and a graduate of 
Edinburgh University, arrived in Bogota in 1824, where he attended Bolivar, 
served the British colony of merchants and soldiers, and was later employed 
by a gold-mining company at Santa Ana. Cheyne overcame much of the 
resistance to the teaching of surgery that French doctors contracted by 
Santander encountered, and awakened in the medical profession an interest 
in acquiring surgical knowledge by being the first to undertake a vesical 
lithotomy in Colombia.31 
Only in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and especially 
between 1902 and 1930 did the provision of health care in Colombia acquire 
a permanent shape and an irreversible momentum. The first decades of the 
twentieth century constituted the formative period of the medical elite, an 
incipient tecnico group with specialised knowledge, that set out to bring about 
orderly, gradual change through an elite consensus within the fabric of the 
existing civilian order. The new medical elite encountered no frontal 
challenge from other elite groups because it was a group apart only in 
professional terms. In other respects, the medical 'establishment' identified 
with and formed part of the ruling national and regional elites, and shared 
their perception of a profession, like law, as an enterprise. 
The prestige of the medical elite was owed largely to its claim to 
professional status. The early twentieth century saw growing sophistication 
in imported medicine and surgery. To a modestly sophisticated descriptive 
anatomy and pathology and a probing of bodily malfunctions that was 
possible with the technology of the previous century - the thermometer, 
stethoscope and laryngoscope, for example - were added the beginnings of 
a trend towards 'laboratory medicine' founded in a cellular view of the 
patient, and the more active intervention by the medical practitioner, 
especially in pathology and histology, in physical processes. Surgeons won 
prestige in the early twentieth century thanks to the slow adoption of an 
antiseptic approach. Indeed, the antiseptic principle proved as fundamental 
to the 'surgical revolution' (the historiography of medicine uses the term 
'revolution' over-frequently and over-casually) as in Scotland where it was 
pioneered. Both hospitals and the expectations of patients of hospitals were 
irresistibly altered.32 Increases in the rate of success in surgical work and 
an expansion of its scope were accompanied by the impact of a slow diffusion 
of anaesthetics, antiseptics and aseptic techniques. A rise in the social status 
and public esteem of physicians was enhanced by the help they gave patients 
with pain - leg ulcers, abscesses, rheumatism, dyspepsia - so that medicine 
was increasingly understood to be more than a mere placebo. Physicians won 
admiration among all social classes for the magical qualities of their work 
and their professional insignia, the white coat and surgical instruments. 
Anxious to be seen as European, Latin American medical elites adopted a 
European view of science as a 'civilising' force and the universal agency of 
change. French influences were very powerful. The French language played 
an important part in the curriculum of secondary schools. Indeed, through 
study in France the Colombian medical elite were imbued with a French 
confidence in the capacity of science to dominate the environment and were 
introduced to the potential efficacy of a centralised medical policy as 
practised in Algeria and Indochina.33 Through subscriptions to European 
periodicals Colombian medical leaders came to identify with the international 
confraternity of professional physicians (especially those battling against 
tropical diseases), absorbing new trends in medicine and surgery, and 
filtering new ideas developed in France, Britain and elsewhere. Differences 
in emphasis in the teaching, research and practice of tropical medicine 
between France and Britain or, indeed, between London and Liverpool might 
seem significant in the French and British Empires; but from the perception 
of the Latin American recipient of the body of European scientific knowledge 
they were little more than nuances of difference.34 Like their counterparts 
in Australasia, the Latin American medical elites looked to the metropoles for 
authority, training and recognition, and set out to adapt metropolitan 
institutions and practices to their own circumstances. External recognition 
enhanced the prestige of the medical profession. Its authority, which was 
upheld by legislation, was reaffirmed in medical emergencies. 
French thinking reinforced domestic traditions in shaping the dominant 
medical ideology, whose exponents saw themselves as crusaders against 
superstition, ignorance, oppression and fatalism. French influences were seen 
in the medical syllabus, the use of French textbooks and the nature of the 
relationship of doctors with the religious orders that did much of the nursing. 
French priorities were visible too in the forty volumes of the Revista de 
Medicina de Bogota published between 1873 and 1922 by the Academia 
Nacional de Medicina, and in the slow formalisation of medical analysis 
observed in two studies by a (later) Dean of the Medical Faculty, Luis 
Cuervo Marquez, Lafiebre amarilla en el interior and Geografia medica y 
patologia de Colombia?5 Even the Hospital San Vicente de Paul in 
Medellin, a philanthropic endeavour intended to serve both the city and the 
region of Greater Antioquia, had a French architect, and could be mistaken 
easily for a French provincial hospital. Because bacteriology played an 
important part in its early stages, French influences were visible too in the 
beginnings of modern veterinary medicine in Colombia. It seems likely that 
Colombian physicians were influenced by male French practitioners, who 
were defensive because their number fell by one-third during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century and were determined that the success of women 
religious and of illegal pharmacies should not squeeze them out of 
business.36 The use of France as a reference-point carried disadvantages. In 
Antioquia, for example, the application of quinine in malaria cases was 
delayed until a protracted debate among French colonial doctors over its 
prophylactic efficacy was resolved in 1914.37 
As in Europe the prestige of the medical profession was enhanced by its 
claims to possess scientific knowledge. This was based in a bacteriological 
explanation identifying living organisms as agencies of diseases. Colombia 
received from Europe the major bacteriological discoveries of the late 
nineteenth century: the bacilli and micrococcus of gonorrhoea, typhoid, 
leprosy, malaria, tuberculosis, cholera, diphtheria and tetanus, and the 
beginnings of vaccination against rabies. Through training abroad members 
of the medical elite came to share in a post-Pasteurian medicine that aimed 
to protect society from 'invisible actors', the microorganisms that cause 
disease, by isolating the protozoa or bacteria, by undertaking protective 
vaccination and by developing curative serums. Thus the microorganism was 
the object of scientific concern, rather than the socioeconomic environment 
in which it flourished. Science came to be seen as a liberator once germ 
theory, discovered by microbiologists in the 1880s, transformed the 
foundation of scientific medicine in Western Europe and the United States 
and placed it on the experimental basis that survives to the present. Gradually 
Colombian professional leaders came, like their French and British 
counterparts, to see the main intellectual challenge of medicine as residing 
in its experimental features. A largely descriptive anatomy and pathology 
slowly lost prestige to histology and physiology, areas that required more 
active therapeutic interventions in physical processes by physicians. The 
medical profession grew in confidence as new surgical practices were 
successfully applied between 1900 and 1930, like a heart suture operation 
conducted upon a young victim of a stabbing or a nefrectomy for a malign 
tumour of the kidney.38 
Training overseas proved from the 1890s to be the critical variable in the 
importation of the 'bio-medical model' shaped in Western Europe and the 
United States. This had several main features of which the most important 
was an allegiance to the broader framework of modern science. To this was 
added an emphasis upon specialisation throughout medical education and a 
relative lack of prestige attached to general practice, plus a mainly urban 
conception of public health. A propensity to prefer spending on flamboyant, 
high-publicity campaigns directed at particular diseases to developing an 
'unheroic' interest in cleaning the water supply and food inspection was 
clearly visible. There was also a tendency to opt for the more prestigious 
work of healing rather than the less esteemed but often more valuable work 
of prevention. (Healing was attractive for its potency, but could not handle 
malnutrition, pneumonia or diarrhoea.) Progressive integration of medical 
practice into an expanding market economy was achieved through the 
payment of fees for services rendered and through the commodification of 
drugs. Some charitable attention to the poor took place. 
Between 1880 and 1930 medicine was projected by some of its 
practitioners as a vocation comparable to that of a priest, a divine mission 
with defined obligations towards God. Frequently the medical doctor received 
a reverential obsequiousness. A pattern evolved by which the medical 
profession was accepted as having equal or even, because of the relative 
scarcity of physicians, superior status to the clergy and lawyers. Medical 
practitioners and surgeons pursued a private income while enjoying a high 
degree of individual clinical freedom that was consonant with the freedoms 
that the state bestowed upon other groups, such as entrepreneurs. The 
medical profession was as individualistic as any other, its members 
depending on private fees for their income; and its pursuit was combined with 
other activities like politics, public administration, the investigation of local 
history and folklore, and the ownership and management of land or of 
pharmacies. Private practice prevailed, qualified by a recognition that 
collectivistic strategies were desirable in particular emergencies or for 
specific purposes and that some charitable palliatives were necessary to assist 
groups too poor to pay private fees. Individual doctors undertook a 
combination of consulting-room treatment, domiciliary visits and hospital 
attention; and, in normal circumstances, one person assumed the entire 
responsibility for patient management. Preferring voluntary action to state 
intervention (and no major political group urged a comprehensive state 
policy), the profession sought to impose regulations to protect recognised 
practitioners from commercial competition. 
The professional leadership sought a rational and harmonious relationship 
with the state that was replicated at the regional level with departmental and 
city government. This was consistent with a ruling ideology that blended 
economic individualism, private initiative, a gospel of self-help and Catholic 
paternalism. Initiatives in public health policy were undertaken only with the 
prior approval or encouragement of the medical profession. The profession 
oversaw the operation of medical regulations; for the most part it looked to 
limited reforms, not sweeping changes; and it promoted prophylactic 
measures. The accreditation of the profession and controls on medical 
practice were controversial matters when they were rigorously applied. 
Measures that were ostensibly designed to protect the patient were sometimes 
believed to be instruments whose main function was to defend narrow 
professional interests. An Antioqueno proposal in 1917 to impose special 
taxes upon medical practices established by foreigners aroused much 
concern. So too did a departmental resolution in Caldas in 1929 that only 
midwives licensed by the Departmental Directorate of Hygiene should be 
allowed to practise, which was introduced because there were high rates of 
maternal and baby mortality as well as of infant blindness and disabilities 
arising from infectious diseases of puerperal origins.39 
Some change in medical education occurred between 1902 and 1930. The 
main limits to its modernisation were threefold. One was the weakness of 
secondary schooling, especially in mathematics and the sciences; biology 
existed in the curriculum in the 1920s only to be suppressed in the 1940s. 
Secondly, there was the university context. The lack of mature faculties and 
departments of the natural sciences with a research tradition in physics, 
chemistry and biology left the medicine faculty in something of an intellectual 
vacuum. Essential disciplines were relegated to the status of 'basic sciences', 
mere tools in the pursuit of medicine rather than autonomous studies with 
their own momentum; and the universities were committed to diffusing the 
benefits of the sciences without taking an active part in shaping their content. 
Thirdly, there was a widening gap between professional pressures associated 
with advances in scientific medicine and public health needs. Premature 
specialisation was attacked as early as 1915: 'Students specialise in urinary 
tracts, organs of the senses and gynaecology, without notions of external 
pathology'.40 Emilio Quevedo and his colleagues have identified a 
discrepancy between medical education, professional practice and public 
health needs in the late 1920s. They have questioned how far public resources 
in the national Faculty of Medicine were allocated to the training of private 
sector practitioners serving a mainly middle-class clientele and how far to the 
training of public health personnel capable of handling urgent matters of 
multi-class concern. 
At the onset of the World Depression of 1929-33 the Colombian position 
in hygiene and sanitation was significantly different from that in 1902 when 
the civil wars ended. A modest but continuous flow of Colombian students 
returning from Paris and, to a lesser extent, London, Liverpool, Edinburgh, 
and Montpellier, gave professional leaders opportunities to absorb and to 
diffuse the expanding stock of preventive and curative knowledge acquired 
in the British and French colonies and in other Latin American countries, 
most notably Brazil.41 Simultaneously, the presence of missions of the 
Rockefeller Foundation meant that Colombia had access both to the 
accumulated technical knowhow of conducting campaigns against tropical 
diseases in the US South and to the distilled experience of sanitary reform 
measures in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Panama.42 
A small core of, reformers embodied the importation of the 'sanitary 
revolution' from Western Europe. Fighting against immobile elements in 
local government and entrenched interests, they strove to secure a preventive 
approach to disease control and to disseminate an environmental theory of 
disease. Just as experimental and scientific medicine was slow to take root, 
so too a strenuous sanitarianism was still exceptional in the early 1920s. Yet 
there was cause for some optimism - because the language of scientific 
method and administrative rationality was slowly percolating most areas of 
political debate - as well as good reason for pessimism because scientific 
method could be put to pseudo-scientific purposes. 
In the late 1910s and 1920s the articulate minority of educated Colombians 
was embroiled in a protracted debate about eugenics, crime and public 
hygiene in which leaders of the medical profession gained in stature by 
playing the main protagonist roles. These discussions, like the linguistic 
debates of the 1890s, reaffirmed the validity of santaferefio cultural traditions 
and satisfied a hunger for intellectual activity,43 helping to reanimate the 
circumscribed intellectual life of the altiplano, where by the 1920s the most 
familiar topics of public argument - religion, linguistics, the law and 
constitution, plus the relative merits of free trade and protection - had lost 
much of their freshness. Eugenics provided a pseudo-scientific rationale for 
a stratified society and underpinned the thesis of racial and cultural 
pessimism advocated most forcefully by one of Colombia's first psychiatrists, 
Miguel Jimenez Lopez, who was minister of government for President Pedro 
Nel Ospina (1922-6). According to Jimenez Lopez the degeneration of 
nuestra raza that resulted from the mixing of Spaniards, Amerindians and 
Africans was the cause of widespread problems like suicide, mental illness 
and alcoholism, for which the only remedies were hygiene campaigns aimed 
at better nourishment and personal cleanliness combined with European 
immigration and educational reform. The discussion that ensued focused on 
whether the progress of the 'race' could be achieved through improving the 
environment. Would the application of preventive medicine have regenerative 
results, or would it enable the allegedly feeble-minded to struggle on and, 
indeed, to multiply, thus damaging the 'national stock'?44 
Within the nucleus of physicians that was prominent in the broader 
movement for social improvement and evolutionary reform that gained 
strength in the 1920s one publicist, Jorge Bejarano, was outstanding. 
Bejarano rebutted the fashionable pseudo-scientific theories that Colombians 
were subject to racial degeneration. Anxious at the growth of crime in Bogota 
especially among male juveniles, Bejarano rejected the contention that 
juvenile crime was a consequence of the degeneration of nuestra raza and set 
out to demolish pseudo-scientific notions that Colombians were, as a mix of 
Spaniard, Amerindian and African, more likely to succumb to criminal 
temptations than Europeans. For Bejarano the causes of crime in Colombia 
lay elsewhere, in particular in the Carcel de Menores in Paiba where boys of 
under ten years of age were kept fettered. The use of shackles - 'that 
inquisitorial instrument of torture' - had disappeared in even the most rigid 
of prisons for adults. Yet its use persisted in the prison for minors, eliciting 
behaviour patterns that were contrary to the basic principles of rehabilitation 
of offenders, in particular a profound hatred of authority and of adults. 
Bejarano heaped praise upon the exemplary casa de reforma at Fontidueno 
in Antioquia, where, he claimed, conditions compared favourably to those in 
institutions in Switzerland and Belgium. In keeping with Law 98 of 1920, 
which created courts for minors (juzgados de menores), the children at 
Fontidueno were placed in the care of a director and a physician both of 
whom had studied neurosurgery. Their home was orderly, a savings habit 
was encouraged, and the work tasks that were appropriate for children to 
perform were carefully defined. Identifying abandonment and vagrancy as the 
main causes of delinquency among children and attacking lotteries as 
undermining a habit of saving among the pueblo, Bejarano looked for 
legislation to abolish child employment on the grounds that the child who 
gained a daily wage became a rebel emancipated from parental tutelage.45 
Bejarano dispensed easily comprehensible but scientifically-based advice 
through pamphlets and later the press. It was as early as 1919 that, alarmed 
at high death rates among women in childbirth and high levels of infant 
mortality, Bejarano alerted literate public opinion through the press to the 
risks of death by tetanus which arose from the application of dirty substances 
and undisinfected rags to the umbilical cord. At the same time he advocated 
rigorous examinations of midwives. Emphasising the desirability of breast-
feeding, the nutritional qualities of mother's milk and the imperative of 
sterilising cow's milk, Bejarano was probably the first prominent Colombian 
to warn against giving babies heavily advertised brand processed foods. 
Some, like powdered milk, he stressed, should be used very sparingly. 
Others, like oats, tapioca and arrowroot, should be used only after taking 
appropriate precautions.46 
Bejarano had a clear perception of public health. Speaking to both his 
students and a broader public of the influence of poverty and misery upon 
hygiene and communal wellbeing, he observed ubiquitous problems of 
malnutrition, venereal diseases and alcoholism, and argued that a close 
connection should be established between the practice of preventive medicine 
and the formulation of public health policy. The main architect and the first 
incumbent of the hygiene ministry founded in 1947, which he managed 
almost like a private hacienda, Bejarano combined leadership qualities, a 
sharp awareness of the changing international environment in hygiene 
questions and a commitment to public health rather than private practice.47 
Another influential figure was Roberto Franco, who pioneered the study, 
prevention and treatment of tropical diseases, pressed for the application of 
scientific method, and played a central part in some early sanitation 
campaigns. After graduating in Bogota, Franco did postgraduate work at the 
Medicine Faculty in Paris between 1898 and 1903, going on to take specialist 
courses at the Institut de Medecine Coloniale and the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. In Tunisia Franco studied cases of 
exanthematic typhus for his Paris thesis; in London he trained in tropical 
pathology, especially the role of laboratory work in diagnosis, prophylaxis 
and treatment. He visited a French veterinary scientist in Argentina to 
experience laboratory studies of veterinary medicine, and began a collection 
of microscopic laminas. Soon recognised as a leading educator of rare 
versatility, Franco was Rector of the National University for two years, 
founder of the Clinic of Tropical Diseases in Bogota, a pioneer of 
microscopic examination in parasitological investigation and a collaborator 
in laboratory development. The instigator of national campaigns against 
tropical anaemia, Franco wrote extensively on both tropical anaemia and 
yellow fever, travelling widely especially in Francophone Africa. Franco 
identified the virus of jungle yellow fever near the Colombian emerald-
mining town of Muzo, thus complementing the discovery of the virus of 
urban yellow fever by Finlay. Franco's contribution to science won both 
international and national recognition.48 
Private lay philanthropy played an important part in initiatives in public 
health, notably the opening of the first adequate public health laboratory in 
Colombia.49 The Samper family imported antidiphtheria serum which they 
preserved in simple refrigerated cases for use without charge; and Bernardo 
Samper Sordo set out to solve the problem of reduced efficacy resulting from 
delays in importing serum from Europe and the United States. After study at 
the School of Public Health at Harvard and MIT, the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the Royal Institute of Public Health, 
Samper and a microbiologist colleague, Jorge Martinez Santamaria, returned 
to Bogota, where, determined to apply technology to biological products, 
they founded a laboratory that produced vaccines against typhoid and rabies. 
In the mid-1920s they branched out, producing other serums, making 
bacteriological and parasitological analyses of water and milk, and launching 
a laboratory of pathological anatomy. Bogota was clearly the most 
appropriate location for the Laboratorio Nacional Samper Martinez since 
information from abroad and from the regions could conveniently be filtered 
there and transport facilities existed for the distribution of vaccines across 
most of the country. The Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, Frederic 
Russell, commented that the laboratory was a model for the continent, with 
which only the laboratories of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires compared in 
completeness and quality of organisation.50 
The history of the relationship between 'official' medicine and popular 
healing practices rooted in Hispanic, Amerindian and black traditions has 
barely received scholarly attention. From the Conquest the Spanish 
authorities in New Granada showed a contempt for the healing and curing 
practices of the defeated Amerindian tribes. Determined to impose patterns 
of conformity among the Amerindians, the colonial authorities attempted to 
destroy the religious beliefs and ceremonies of Amerindians that constituted 
the basis of the political power of the shamans. This campaign was 
complemented by a drive to root out the medical 'heresies' of Amerindians 
- curing rituals and therapies - which formed part of their belief system and 
further upheld the power of the shamans.51 It was characteristic of the 
colonial rulers that they interpreted consumption of the fermented alcoholic 
drink, chicha, simultaneously as a problem of public health, an offence 
against God and a contravention of the public order, and that in 1699 the 
penalty of excommunication was threatened by the diocesan Chapter of 
Popayan against users of guarapo, fermented sugar-cane liquors.52 The 
incomplete evidence available indicates that Amerindian medical traditions 
survived among both the Amerindian minorities living in the barely populated 
and lightly governed jungle and desert regions on the periphery of the colony 
and the majority of the population of mixed race inhabiting the core of the 
country. Black medicine was similarly the object of official derision and of 
attempts at suppression. The association of the use of medicinal plants by 
blacks in Cartagena with witchcraft, magical ceremonies and the consumption 
of hallucinogenic drugs was cause for the intervention of the Holy 
Inquisition.53 
Amerindian and black curing and healing traditions proved powerfully 
durable, because they formed an important part of the broader system of 
popular beliefs, because they embodied a covert protest against the dominant 
order, and because much of the population had no access to 'official' 
medicine as a result of a shortage of recognised practitioners. Access to 
professional status as a physician was ethnically and, given the power of the 
religious orders in the education of physicians until the early nineteenth 
century, religiously exclusive. Legislation stipulated that medical doctors 
should be white; and evidence from Popayan in 1807 suggests that limpieza 
de sangre was, indeed, a prerequisite of medical practice.54 It is unclear 
whether legislation regulating the profession of apothecary had comparable 
consequences.55 Excluded groups could work as bone-setters, herbalists and 
surgeon-barbers, absorbing a blend of Amerindian, black and Hispanic 
popular traditions and transmitting orally the knowledge of their professional 
secrets within the family. Much of the population had recourse only to 
folklore traditions that embodied medical syncretisms, like warding off evil 
with plants and with prayers to special cults. These mirrored syncretic 
religious and food practices, and have survived to the present. The mediation 
of spirits was sometimes invoked for healing purposes. And medical and 
religious 'superstition' went hand in hand: an illness that was believed to 
have been caused by envidia required prayer before curing was possible. 
Susto, empache, envidia and other illnesses which exemplified Hispanic folk, 
nosological and etiological concepts proliferated. No one in Aritama, the 
community studied by the Reichel-Dolmatoffs in the late 1950s, believed that 
scientific medication as understood in Europe could cure a disease unless it 
was accompanied by magical remedies and practices.56 
In the present state of research it is unclear whether hierarchies of 
traditional healers set out to forge a distinct cultural identity, to form bonds 
of solidarity, and to resist an increasingly cohesive medical establishment. It 
seems likely that most aimed to accommodate new challenges. It is clear, 
however, that in the first half of the twentieth century a growing number of 
graduate practitioners was competing in a relatively inelastic market for 
medical services with healers, charlatans, itinerant mountebanks and remedy 
vendors. There was no attempt to adapt to a pluralistic medical environment 
by creating traditional healers' associations that operated within national 
health services as part of the power-base of new ruling groups - practices that 
were to evolve, in contrast, in parts of post-independent sub-Saharan 
Africa.57 Ordinary users of medical services, constrained by cost 
considerations, had in the light of experience to choose between 'modern' 
medicine, medicina casera and traditional healing techniques. Research has 
yet to be done into how far the public resorted to one or to a combination of 
these options, and into how far the choice of healer and medical practitioner 
indicated membership of a particular social class or ethnic group.58 Gonzalo 
Sanchez has investigated attempts at criminalisation of some popular political 
protest and syndical activities in the early twentieth century.59 It seems 
probable that such moves were complemented by efforts to suppress the work 
of popular healers and curers, and that they struck at the core of mestizo and 
mulatto popular culture, violating communal values among Afro-Colombians 
and Amerindians. 
Frank Safford has argued that one goal of white elites in Colombia during 
the nineteenth century was a homogeneous society.60 The consolidation of 
official 'medicine' meant not only that black and Amerindian medical 
practices were frowned upon but that Hispanic folk medicine was regarded 
with a similar disdain. First recorded in Bogota in 1835, homeopathic 
medicine received limited official recognition in the nineteenth century. 
Later, however, parts of the medical establishment looked askance at 
homeopathic medicine, probably because it influenced and interacted with 
Hispanic folk medicine. The limits to the political influence of the medical 
elite were indicated by the failure of a project to restrict the practice of 
homeopathic medicine by law in 1931. 
By 1930 a clear momentum for incremental change had emerged in the 
health care sector. The upper and middle classes were demanding modern 
curative medicine along European lines, with some allowances made for local 
circumstances; and a minority of medical professionals trained in Europe 
enjoyed a rare prestige. Although the framework for scientific education was 
fragile and that for scientific research little short of nonexistent, the impetus 
to an expansion of professional training in medicine was irreversible, as the 
number of middle-class clients for private practitioners grew and organised 
labour became aware of the merits of modern medicine. An incipient 
professional network connected by training, shared attitudes and common 
interests enjoyed some influence upon decision-making. Yet in areas as 
diverse as improvements in urban public hygiene and investigations into the 
curative properties of medicinal plants, initiative depended on a few 
individuals usually working alone with few material resources. The 'sanitary 
revolution', mediated to a considerable extent by elements in the medical 
profession, had a piecemeal impact upon urban structures and attitudes, but 
its significance for the bulk of the rural population was still very limited. The 
total accomplishment in Colombia between Mutis and the World Depression 
was not considerable. The evidence available suggests that most 
improvements in life expectancy and morbidity and mortality after the end of 
the civil wars were due more to better nutrition and hygiene than to the 
actions of the medical profession. For articulate minorities with a clear vision 
of 'modernity' hygiene and sanitation constituted one priority among many 
that pressed upon limited resources, and were usually seen as of less urgency 
than public works construction, primary education and policing. The number 
of medical professionals remained too small to dent the impact of popular 
practitioners, who remained vital to the welfare of the urban and rural poor 
of all ethnic groups. 
Growth, Disease, Property and the State, c. 1902-1940 
Colombia was, by Latin American standards, late in achieving insertion 
within the international economy. Various explanations for this are 
customarily given: the political uncertainty caused by civil wars and 
disturbances before 1902 and fears that they might recur later; the adverse 
impact of political instability upon both foreign investment and domestic 
entrepreneurship; the character of the Colombian commodity profile and the 
high costs of transport caused by topographical fragmentation; and, not least, 
the prevalence of disease, usually labelled 'tropical', in the tierra templada, 
the middling altitudes, and the tierra caliente, the tropical lowlands, which 
contained most of the main river- and sea-ports. By the early 1920s, 
however, conditions were changing significantly. Political order seemed 
assured by an enduring pact between the Conservative and Liberal parties, 
which were the bulwarks of a limited democracy in which the minority party 
enjoyed a guaranteed place in Congress and semi-competitive elections were 
held at constitutionally prescribed intervals. A new economic vitality was 
observed, principally in the export sector, where a cautious buoyancy 
pervaded the production and commercialisation of coffee and bananas for 
export and an overconfidence surrounded oil production. Early railway 
development and the conversion of many mule-trails into cart- and then 
motor-roads lowered transport costs. Export expansion acted as a spur to 
some growth in domestic trade, and together they fostered some urban 
expansion. All these changes had consequences for the health sector. 
Export growth had immediate implications for health conditions. Seasonal 
workers migrating from the altiplano to the coffee-producing lands of the 
tierra templada were gravely exposed to intestinal diseases.61 Both the oil-
producing entrepot of Barrancabermeja and the banana-producing zone of 
Santa Marta were notorious for their disease hazards. Many workers building 
the coffee-transporting railway that connected Medellm and the river-port of 
Puerto Berrio were victims of tuberculosis caused by overcrowding and 
unhygienic living and working conditions. In 1919 striking workers on the 
Ferrocarril del Norte demanded medical attention in the event of an accident 
or illness and indemnisation for work accidents. Poor hygiene conditions 
gave rise to militancy and strike action on the Ferrocarril del Pacifico in 
1926. During the late 1920s labour leaders began to display alertness to 
occupational risks and environmental hazards. Disease posed a disincentive 
even to seasonal labour migrations. Upland workers were often unwilling to 
move permanently to coffee-producing areas because they were unhealthy. 
The owners of the Santa Barbara estate at Sasaima, Cundinamarca, took some 
precautionary action - vaccination, the whitewashing of buildings, the use of 
aguardiente with quinine and the application of acido fenico.62 These 
presumably had slight impact on the main scourge in coffee farms, intestinal 
diseases. 
Urban growth gave rise to new concerns. The Bogota city authority sought 
a foreign loan in the early 1890s to extend its sewage system and to enlarge 
the piped water supply; Medellin built a cement aqueduct and planned a 
sewage system; Barranquilla became more alert to the risks posed by the 
adjacent open swamps of the Magdalena estuary. Between the 1880s and the 
late 1920s the water supply and public sanitation were issues of acrimonious 
debate in Bogota. In 1923 a city protest surfaced as a consequence of 
mismanagement of the water supply, drainage system and general grievances 
about sanitation and hygiene conditions in the Paseo Bolivar of the Barrios 
Orientales of Bogota. A city-wide crisis erupted in 1929 as a consequence of 
a decision of the Governor of Cundinamarca to sack the mayor of Bogota 
after he dismissed the managers of the city water-supply and tramway, who 
belonged to a deeply unpopular city rosea that also included two Cabinet 
ministers whose corruption and incompetence angered bogotanos of all social 
classes. 
The dominant assumptions of the era of export-led growth were 
reproduced in the health care sector. It was believed that an orderly progress 
could be achieved by importing foreign technology (surgical and laboratory 
equipment), vaccines and organisational practices to combat and control 
endemic diseases like malaria, hookworm and yellow fever, by introducing 
skilled personnel from 'developed' countries on temporary contracts and 
training Colombians abroad to replace them, and by enlarging the access of 
national, departmental and city government to foreign loans destined for 
water-supply projects and public sanitation schemes. A stress upon the 
pooling of pre-existing national resources (and their upgrading) with 
complementary foreign funding that could bring about evolutionary 
improvement was entirely consonant with the broader model of desarrollo 
hacia afuera. The presence of transmissible diseases compelled a 
rudimentary state to establish at least the framework of systematic sanitary 
and medical services. Foreign assistance in the reform of the state apparatus, 
both at a national level and in strategic locations like the Caribbean port of 
Barranquilla - reforms that corresponded to both Latin American positivistic 
traditions and the thrust of progressivism in the United States - would assure 
a more efficacious use of human and material resources. No direct foreign 
investment in health care was contemplated, so that few profits would be 
expatriated. Foreign personnel would be hired only on short-term contracts, 
and would be displaced by a pool of national expertise that grew as medical 
education was professionalised. Thus international cooperation would be 
secured without awakening xenophobic feeling (of which, outside the small 
banana zone, there was little compared to Mexico, Cuba or Uruguay) or 
evoking more than the mildest of nationalist protests.63 National health 
conditions would improve, so that foreign managers and technicians would 
be more willing to work in Colombia. And the anxieties of the US 
immigration authorities and of a broader North American public about the 
transmission of disease on merchant shipping from Latin America (as from 
Europe) would be allayed, allowing the international commodity trade to 
expand without encountering setbacks from which Colombia's trading rivals 
could benefit. To adhere to international sanitary conventions and to be 
seen to be adhering to them were believed to be essential to cordial 
commercial relations. In 1924 Colombia was represented at the Seventh 
PanAmerican Sanitary Conference held in Havana, which agreed that 
governments in the Americas should control transmissible diseases so as to 
ease international trade and sea communications. 
Against the optimistic assumptions associated with the desarrollo hacia 
afuera model were weighed pessimistic prognoses. Sustained improvements 
in the status of Colombian hygiene and sanitation were threatened by poverty 
and scarce domestic resources, especially outside the leading cities where 
most of the qualified physicians resided. Significant problems were posed by 
public ignorance, entrenched interests reluctant to surrender power to 
medical boards, the prevailing level of knowledge of tropical diseases and the 
difficulty of enforcing enlightened regulation that was imposed from above 
with slight regard for public consultation. A further obstacle lay in 
complacent upper-class explanations of social conditions, which, providing 
a convenient rationale for taking no action, placed most of the blame for 
death, disease and deprivation on the moral failings of the poor, and the 
remainder on social indiscipline, a lack of Catholic charity (or, alternatively, 
of humanistic altruism) among the prosperous and the ineradicable vices that 
supposedly corroded the political system. Unevennesses in the quality of 
public administration by department and municipality were aggravated by 
disorder and a high turnover of personnel in public administration, as the 
competition for government positions and contracts intensified and public 
revenues grew during the 1920s boom. Furthermore, there was no way of 
measuring how far irregular assaults on epidemics had an enduring impact on 
public health. Continuity in commitment to progressive policies could not be 
guaranteed, especially at departmental and municipal level. What seemed a 
significant legislative breakthrough could soon fall into abeyance or be 
reversed. Intractable too was the Colombian epidemiological profile. 
Modern public health policy had its antecedents in the late colonial period. 
Issues that confronted policy-makers in the 1920s had been raised by a 
member of the Botanical Expedition, Pedro Fermfn de Vargas, author of the 
Memoria sobre la poblacion del nuevo reino. Among the themes he 
considered were sanitary conditions and prophylactic measures, the use of 
quarantine and the distribution of smallpox vaccine, the neglect of hospices 
and the problem of leprosy. In the 1920s political life was dominated by a 
propertied patriciate that lived cheek-by-jowl with the poor in cities where 
patterns of residential segregation by social class had yet to emerge. Because 
cities were still small, public health provision remained modest compared to 
the Asistencia Publica in Buenos Aires, where the portefio elite had been the 
improbable 'harbinger' of welfare in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.64 Even though the knowledge of diet, clothing, housing and hygiene 
was superior among patricians to that of the poor, they were exposed to many 
of the same health hazards, and, although anxious to safeguard their rights 
and keep taxes down, they recognised the need for some state intervention to 
contain emergencies. Thus the orthodoxy of the minimalist state that 
governed during the decades of Conservative rule was set aside. However, 
the assumption prevailed that through self-improvement and the purchase of 
education and property individuals rather than groups could enter and 
participate in the reigning order.65 This applied to physicians, whose 
professional qualifications entitled them to influence policy at the level -
national, departmental or municipal - where they worked. Individual 
influence was more commonplace than collective pressure. 
Epidemic was an everpresent risk in the tierra templada and the tierra 
caliente. Colombia was spared epidemics on the scale of India, where at a 
modest estimate bubonic plague killed over eight million people between 
1886 and 1914. Colonial officials panicked out of fear of riots, disorder and 
a possible embargo on Indian shipping which would damage Indian markets, 
disrupt flows of raw materials and disturb the intricate system for the 
multilateral settlement of the British balance-of-payments.66 Yet the 
department of Antioquia alone experienced typhoid fever epidemics, most 
severely in 1913-4; polio from 1917; yaws was evident in all the Antioqueno 
river valleys in the 1920s; and diphtheria was a serious problem in the mid-
19308.67 The lives of the propertied elite and their families could be at stake 
in an epidemic. Their interests were jeopardised if they could not visit their 
lowland properties, and their incomes threatened if their workforces were 
depleted by disease, not least because Colombia had little success in drawing 
immigrants and remained a profoundly underpopulated country. The 
Conservative and Liberal elites of the centenarista generation, like the 
medical professionals influenced by the French Third Republic, were imbued 
with a powerful republican ideology that demanded collective civic action to 
counter and, where possible, forestall outbreaks of epidemic. If most 
decisions regarding health care were rooted in the structures and experiences 
of daily life, epidemic posed a test for the propertied classes as to how far 
they were willing to countenance a growth of state intervention and to accept 
restrictions on the freedom to take their own decisions. For the most part the 
propertied classes were slow to endorse an expansion of the coercive and 
disciplinary forces of the state when these threatened their own interests. An 
outbreak of an epidemic in a Caribbean or Magdalena port could bring 
business to a standstill: shipping would be diverted or at best delayed by 
disinfection procedures and medical checks; migrant labourers deterred; and 
trade permanently lost to a rival port. Opponents of controls argued with 
some force that a breakdown in trade could signify a fall in the quantity and 
range of available foodstuffs, and that this could contribute to the spread of 
disease by causing a deterioration in the diet of the population. Food 
shortages could lead, too, to riot and civil unrest. Ruling elites, in normal 
circumstances united by formal and informal structures and procedures and 
cemented by patterns of sociability, could be divided when the welfare of the 
port in terms of freedom from disease had to be calculated against its 
wellbeing in terms of trade and income. Medical practitioners could clash 
with merchants over which priority should be paramount. Caution about the 
transfer of power to a medico-jefe with mandatory powers in medical 
emergencies might seem justified to merchant elites if an epidemic were used 
by enlightened reformers as an opportunity to undertake an expensive hygiene 
offensive. There was the possibility of a challenge to the status quo from 
radical groups arguing both that epidemics demonstrated the need for more 
thorough state provision, and that the mobilisation of private sector expertise, 
philanthropic resources and emergency amateur competence was insufficient 
to meet the crisis. Though usually depicted as weak, impoverished and 
disarticulated (and at its weakest perhaps in the Pacific port of 
Buenaventura), the Colombian state of the early twentieth century did have 
the capacity to move decisively when crisis loomed, international pressures 
were applied and a consensus for action was found between the national, 
regional and port authorities and the main export-import interests. In the 
1910s and 1920s yellow fever outbreaks at Buenaventura, Cartagena and 
Cucuta were carefully watched by the Panama Canal Commission which 
enforced strict quarantine regulations and kept in close touch with the 
Direction Nacional de Higiene in Bogota. The likelihood that trading 
relationships would be severed when the Canal Commission threatened to 
exclude shipping from Buenaventura during an epidemic prompted hasty 
action by the Colombian government.68 
Medical elites required little political skill to persuade the incumbent 
president of the desirability of a hygiene measure, to convince the propertied 
elites of the affordability, feasibility and efficacy of a proposal, and to push 
it through a Congress with whose members they were connected by family, 
schooling and social class. Just as Gaitan enjoyed a certain deference because 
he had been trained in law in Italy, medical leaders trained abroad 
commanded the deference that was considered due to rare expertise. The 
presence of a respected group of medico-politicians usually smoothed the 
passage of legislation through Congress between 1910 and the 1940s. Because 
hygiene and sanitation were not issues like education around which the debate 
over the powers of the Church and State crystallised, public health reformers 
were able to keep a distance from some of the more destructive debates 
conducted at all levels of articulate society. Most features of sanitary reform 
(not the handling of venereal diseases) could be debated without repetitious 
polemic, and sequences of improvements could be introduced without active 
pressures to dismantle and reverse them. Yet this very distance from the 
mainstream of policy discussion carried disadvantages: only in crises was 
public hygiene at the centre of the policy-making agenda; and only in the 
hospital subsector did health care feature as a significant part of the 
institutional thrust of powerful institutions like the Church and the military. 
The legislative and institutional framework for health care, hygiene and 
sanitation changed significantly between the 1880s and 1920s. In some ways 
Cuba provided an appropriate model for Colombian policy-makers. During 
the second US occupation of Cuba (1906-9) a public hygiene ministry with 
nationwide responsibilities was established to which all municipal hygiene 
authorities were required to report daily on the prevalence of mortality and 
morbidity; and by the early 1930s each municipio employed at least one 
physician to provide medical services and supplied a dispensary plan. Cuba, 
however, differed from Colombia in significant respects. The Cuban 
epidemiological profile was less complex, owing, in part, to the nature of the 
soil; Cuba had a lower malarial endemicity than Venezuela and Colombia. 
Cuba was more prosperous, smaller and less regionally fragmented. She also 
had the advantages of a new influx of Spanish immigrants in the early 
twentieth century who strengthened a tradition of mutualist health 
associations, and then in the late 1930s a wave of Spanish Republican 
refugees, some of them health professionals.69 
In Colombia legislation was introduced, codified and refined that governed 
such areas as the quarantining of ports and the organisation of leper colonies 
and lazarettoes, the exercise of the medical profession, and the sanitary 
inspection of meat and the management of slaughter-houses. A Junta 
Nacional de Higiene that had been superimposed in 1886-7 on the juntas 
seccionales de higiene that functioned spasmodically in the aftermath of 
independence, was given such responsibilities as impeding the propagation 
of bubonic plague from Peru. The expansion of the brewing and soft drinks 
industries was accompanied by new legislation regulating the production of 
soft, alcoholic and distilled beverages. 
Political order in the 1910s and 1920s rested heavily on the assumption that 
a resumption of civil war could be avoided if national decisions were taken 
only after processes of bargaining and compromise between regional interests 
were completed. Indeed, there was a marked reluctance to establish new 
institutions which increased taxation, concentrated power and resources in the 
capital, and could jeopardise or suffocate initiatives taken at regional or local 
level that were better attuned to local circumstances. Health issues illustrated 
this conundrum well. As in the city of Guayaquil in Ecuador, the spread of 
medical advances was uneven in Colombia; new unfamiliar methods met with 
some elite and popular resistance; prophylaxis was unevenly applied; and 
fears of vaccines, like inoculation by variolation and Jenner cowpox vaccine, 
were commonplace.70 Yet the case for national initiative was powerfully 
illustrated by the formation of a Junta Nacional Organizadora de la Lucha 
Antituberculosa in 1918-9. This had the functions of guiding and co-
ordinating the campaign against tuberculosis, pooling information and 
diffusing knowledge. This Junta exemplified a pattern that became the norm. 
Central government provided co-ordination and information for the 
departments and municipalities and established norms in areas as diverse as 
food inspection and cemetery management, while assuming broader 
regulatory responsibilities in matters of supra-regional concern, for example, 
hygiene on river shipping and immigration checks. 
The main aim of the Direction Nacional de Higiene founded in 1918 was 
to break the mould of cumbersome sanitary organisation that was operated by 
police forces and was notoriously slow to respond to epidemics. Medical 
authorities were now empowered to make prophylactic dispositions. Each 
departmental capital was to have its own hygiene service, with two doctors 
trained in public hygiene, one bacteriologist, one chemist and one municipal 
engineer. The four Caribbean ports of Puerto Colombia, Cartagena, Santa 
Marta and Riohacha and the two Pacific ports of Buenaventura and Tumaco 
were each to have medical personnel assisted by sanitary police. In spite of 
the possible damage to commercial interests, each case of yellow fever, 
smallpox and typhus was to be notified publicly.71 However, the enlightened 
legislation of the early twentieth century should be treated with caution. It 
was at most times and in most regions no more than a declaration of political 
intention. Some legislation was probably unenforceable from its enactment. 
Ley 46 of 1918 proscribed the renting out of rooms that failed to meet basic 
hygiene requirements, and obliged all municipalities of over 15,000 
inhabitants to devote two per cent of their income to the building of 
'hygienic' housing for the 'proletarian class'. Decreto No. 632 of 1920 
required modern bathrooms and the provision of hot water for employees of 
meat-packing depots and slaughter-houses.72 A resolution in 1920 outlined 
regulations for hygiene in stables, made the building of latrines compulsory 
in all new urban and rural dwellings, and provided for domiciliary visits by 
sanitary inspectors.73 
Debate about the powers that a central agency handling sanitation and 
hygiene should enjoy was complemented by uncertainty about where it should 
be placed. The presence of the Consejo Superior de Sanidad in 1913 within 
the ministry of government reflected the orthodoxy that sanitation was 
principally a question of public order, a view that was confirmed in 1914 
when the successor of the Consejo, the Junta Central de Higiene, was 
similarly attached. Indeed, because public hygiene was interpreted as a 
policing issue, the municipality of Medellin employed not only a hygiene 
inspector (inspector de aseo) invested with police powers, but also sanitary 
police. During a reorganisation of the public administration in 1918 the 
Direction Nacional de Higiene was relocated in the ministry of public 
instruction, public hygiene being reinterpreted as one of the pedagogic 
functions of the state. But, fitting uncomfortably here, the Direction 
Nacional was moved to the catch-all ministry of agriculture and commerce, 
until it was returned in 1923 to the ministry of public instruction. The 
importance of public hygiene was confirmed; but conceptual uncertainty was 
underlined in 1925 when the ministry was renamed the ministry of public 
instruction and salubridad publica. Further schemes of reorganisation 
culminated in a decision in 1936 that issues of sanitation and hygiene should 
be shunted off into a new ministry of work, hygiene and social insurance 
(prevision social), whose main function lay in arbitration and conciliation of 
labour and employers.74 
Questions of health, hygiene and sanitation assumed a prominent, if not a 
primary position, on the national agenda. Domestic forces combined with 
external pressures to promote a series of incremental changes. Foreign 
entrepreneurs who sought a positive image as enlightened pioneers battling 
against the odds to open up the tropics and as allies of progressive national 
businessmen in the pursuit of national development preached the desirability 
of habits of hygiene and sanitation along with those of work, discipline, 
thrift, and co-operation, especially among skilled workers.75 Entrepreneurs, 
foreign and domestic, combined with workers to push for sanitary changes 
in ports, especially on the Caribbean coast; and improvements in standards 
of hygiene and health care were a recurring demand made by unionised 
banana workers in the inter-war period.76 There were long-standing 
pressures too from the military (and also veterans from the civil wars) for 
improved pensions and health care provision, especially for the war-wounded 
and for highlanders who succumbed to tropical diseases when posted to the 
lowlands.77 The argument for improved welfare for the military was 
strengthened after the First World War by the knowledge that health care 
systems in Europe were designed specifically to meet the needs of veterans. 
The case for more regular medical inspection of troops, improvements in 
their diet, living and working conditions, and better hospital treatment was 
made emphatically. At the same time civil bureaucrats sought to emulate the 
social security systems in Western and Central Europe designed to forestall 
revolutionary and radical unrest and to counteract the appeal of the Soviet 
goal of a universal, free health care system. Since dissident military and 
bureaucrats had a proven capacity to disrupt the political order, modest 
welfare extension to them seemed prudent in a period of growth. 
If the hoped-for gains from incorporation into the international economy 
were to be realised, the propertied classes acknowledged, albeit 
incompletely, that issues of hygiene and sanitation must be tackled. A 
reputation for lack of salubriousness especially in the sea- and river-ports and 
for epidemic in the lowlands posed a deterrent to foreign investment that 
outlived the national reputation for civil war. High morbidity and mortality 
rates diminished the quality of the workforce and raised employer costs. 
Problems of hygiene and sanitation were increasingly perceived as aspects of 
social disorganisation that frustrated growth by liberal merchants, and as 
obstacles to the realisation of individual dignity and a healthy family life by 
Catholic activists. Nevertheless, economic growth facilitated more 
infrastructure spending. The building of a telegraph system connecting all 
provincial capitals, sea and river ports with Bogota made possible the rapid 
notification of medical emergencies to the central authorities. The precocious 
development of aviation in the 1920s speeded up the movement both of 
personnel to handle emergencies and of essential supplies like vaccines and 
syringes. 
The uses of business welfarism - mainly some modest provision in 
housing, health care and education - were acknowledged by foreign and 
domestic entrepreneurs. US experience of the 1920s indicated that the image 
of a benevolent employer who stood in the vanguard of social progress and 
strengthened the family life of the worker was a convenient protective device 
that kept the state at bay and deflected trade union militancy. The 
employment of a doctor could be justified on the company balance sheet in 
terms of social efficiency, so long as the application of preventive medicine 
assured a healthy and productive workforce, the use of medical examinations 
excluded unhealthy applicants from jobs, and malingering was combated.78 
The US banana enterprise, the United Fruit Company, prioritising the 
efficiency of workers, organised and maintained a sanitary service, and 
campaigned vigorously against malaria. The Colombian-owned sugar-cane 
estates at Sincerin, south of Cartagena, likewise recognised the benefits of 
enterprise welfare. The firm built a clean town where workers were housed 
in carefully screened dwellings raised from the damp ground. Obligatory 
medical inspection was extended to include the children of workers. 
Company doctors examined workers and their families for evidence of 
tropical anaemia and malaria, a disease where there was a constant risk of 
reinfection, by contrast with yellow fever, which, though more deadly, 
appeared only in epidemic form. A modest business paternalism was rooted 
in self-interest: 'A good doctor...' wrote P. L. Bell, the US Trade 
Commissioner, in 1921, '...is the best asset a(n oil) camp can have, and his 
services will go a long way towards the efficiency of the work and the 
success of the enterprise.'79 Because the entire personnel of US dredging 
enterprises had been wiped out in a few weeks, US enterprises in mining and 
forestry were cautious. US and British mining firms tried to keep the threat 
of malaria within check by clearing the jungle for a considerable distance 
around their encampments and dredgers and by draining or spraying with oil 
the stagnant water where mosquitoes bred.80 
In the public and private sectors alike the revenues from export-led 
prosperity in the 1920s financed innovations like the appointment of the first 
official doctors in the coffee municipalities of Antioquia and Caldas and of 
physicians attached to companies building railways and roads. There were 
career openings too for young doctors in the cities dealing with port 
inspection, food inspection and forensic investigations. But the benefits of 
these innovations were not generally or evenly spread. Urban growth gave 
rise to a patchwork of initiatives to establish plazas and promote sport for 
recreation and leisure, and to protect children - mostly within the framework 
of existing charitable organisations like the Sociedades de Mejoras Publicas. 
Thus, for example, in Bucaramanga, in 1915 senior medical figures opened 
a medical dispensary that provided free medical attention for the poor as a 
dependency of the Sociedad de San Vicente de Paul; and a gota de leche was 
established in 1922.81 Because the growth of cities increased the risk of 
adulterated foodstuffs and a reduction in their nutritional value, elements 
from the middle class pressed for protection of consumers from adulteration 
and falsification of foodstuffs by retailers hoping to undercut the prices of 
their competitors by including additives in staples like bread and milk. Some 
action was taken against the contamination of foodstuffs sold in street-
markets that could cause infection, and to promote the sterilisation of milk 
and reduce the risk of infection from tubercular cows. At the same time better 
public hygiene became part of the agenda of the mutual aid societies of city 
artisans.82 
As early as 1914 some of the first environmental health measures were 
taken, in particular the proscription of fouling drinking water by depositing 
waste in it, like bagasse from sugar-cane and de-pulped coffee beans. In 1922 
legislation was introduced that was designed to provide the medical 
authorities with the necessary powers to handle emergencies. Procedures 
were established for declaring a disease infectious; and the occasions when 
such a declaration was mandatory were specified. Local authorities were 
given coercive powers to remove inhabitants of a dwelling that was deemed 
a threat to public health. Headteachers were required to demand official 
vaccination certificates from parents, and a similar obligation was placed 
upon prisons. Vaccination against smallpox was made obligatory for every 
child under seven years of age and revaccination was required again at eleven 
and twenty-one years. The sanitary authorities were instructed to draw up 
demographic data. In built-up areas the planting of crops like bananas and 
maize where mosquitoes could breed in stagnant pools was prohibited within 
200 metres of homes. Similarly, such buildings as tanneries, distilleries, soap 
factories and pigsties were to be located at least 200 metres from human 
habitations.83 A resolution in 1939 summarised and enlarged upon earlier 
decisions that imposed responsibilities upon municipalities to provide 
adequate sewage and drainage systems and upon property-owners to connect 
buildings to the mains water-supply and to sewage and drainage outlets. One 
bathroom was to be built in every new home intended for up to twelve 
inhabitants, and an additional one for the thirteenth. No new house might be 
built on sites that lay below the nearest drainage and sewage outlets.84 
However, much of this legislation went unenforced. The Colombian state 
tended to recoil from intervention, and was so fragmented and inefficacious 
that there was never a motive for opposition to the hygiene authorities of the 
scale and significance of the Brazilian revolta contra vacina in the city of Rio 
de Janeiro in 1904. This was the movement of resistance to the programme 
of Gongalves Oswaldo Cruz to eradicate yellow fever, smallpox and bubonic 
plague: its hallmark was an obligatory vaccination programme; 'mosquito 
inspectors' were employed to spray mosquito larva and to mark for 
demolition buildings they deemed unsanitary; and a campaign to counter the 
spread of yellow fever provided a rationale for compulsory rehousing.85 
Whereas rebellion in Rio was posited on the assumption of the sanctity of the 
rights of the individual against the coercive power of a relatively 
authoritarian state in which Jacobin radical-republicans played an important 
part, in Colombia individualistic attitudes were entrenched and positivism 
assumed a less thorough and a less authoritarian form. Similarly, Colombian 
politics ruled out the kind of response to epidemic that occurred when yellow 
fever broke out along the coast of northern Peru between 1919 and 1922. The 
authoritarian idealism of the sanitary campaign of Henry Hanson, 'the Pied 
Piper of (northern) Peru', who exercised a 'sanitary dictatorship' complete 
with cavalry backing and a cruiser, was unthinkable in Colombia, where the 
balancing of regional and local interests aborted any possibility of a 
dictatorship like that of Legufa.86 
The failure to enforce well-intentioned health measures continued to deter 
some areas of business even in the 1920s. During the inter-war decades 
modern tourism crystallised; and various enterprises, including the United 
Fruit Company, which sought new profitable outlets, diversified into cruise-
liner tourism in the Caribbean.87 But the major tourist enterprises were wary 
of Cartagena, preferring stopping-points of known salubriousness like 
Havana and Kingston, Jamaica: '....if there were sewage and pavement in 
Cartagena itself, if the suburbs were cleaned up, if the shallow waters were 
filled in with silt dredged from the harbor, and if a campaign were instituted 
among the lower classes of people, forcing them to use covered garbage cans 
and screened doors and windows (as at Panama and Colon) the town would 
be transformed into one of the healthiest places in the Tropics. It would 
attract thousands of tourists annually, if good hotels were provided for the 
winter season, by reason of its great ancient forts and other features of 
historical interest, which would well repay a visit of a week. Tarpon and 
robalo fishing is very plentiful in the protected bay, and there is an 
extraordinary ocean beach over which an automobile can be run for miles, 
stretching away to the northeast of the city and terminating at a picturesque 
headland. However, under present conditions, without sewage, paving, etc., 
Cartagena's possibilities cannot be realised and the place certainly cannot be 
recommended as a health or tourist resort now'.88 
Accelerated involvement in the international economy after the First World 
War was accompanied by the contracting of foreign missions from diverse 
countries to advise on policy. Swiss advice was sought on the military; 
Belgian on education; the US professor Edwin Kemmerer visited Colombia 
to advise on monetary, fiscal, taxation and banking reforms twice in a 
decade. Paul W. Drake has argued that economic missions represented 
transfers of technology and institution building, and that they created 
opportunities to demonstrate a determination to 'rationalise' economic 
organisation by embracing foreign economic models, updating economic 
techniques, fortifying institutions, and bolstering the financial management 
and capacity of the state. Foreign missions promoted fiscal order and a 
broader international economic stability that awakened creditor and investor 
confidence. Drake contends that offspring of the Progressive Era like 
Kemmerer, who recoiled from the belligerent expansionism prevailing in the 
United States during the 1900s and early 1910s, believed strongly that 
socioeconomic improvements of mutual benefit to the Americas could best be 
brought about by technical and scientific advances in institutions managed by 
apolitical, public-spirited experts. They should be helped by tactful, 
industrious, neutral foreign advisers, who should in no circumstances be 
employees of federal agencies in Washington.89 
There were clear similarities between the Rockefeller missions which 
visited Colombia continuously from 1917 and those of Kemmerer. 
Rockefeller advisers helped raise the capacity of the national and city 
authorities to handle problems of hygiene by taking part in the launching of 
public health laboratories in Bogota and Barranquilla. They transferred 
organisational models and also technology when they were asked to determine 
the presence of yellow fever in Colombia and to advise upon any needed 
modifications to quarantine arrangements, and also when they undertook 
campaigns against hookworm in Cundinamarca and elsewhere.90 Rockefeller 
advice was pragmatically valuable in providing external and apparently 
neutral validation of diagnoses of public health problems by local officials. 
In 1923 the confirmation by Foundation advisers of a diagnosis of yellow 
fever by bumangues doctors during an outbreak of the disease in Santander 
prompted the disbursement of funds to counter its spread.91 
The general thrust of Rockefeller advice was to encourage trends among 
the embryonic body of public health expertise in Bogota and several 
departmental capitals to rationalise sanitary organisation, to strengthen 
incipient public hygiene institutions, and to establish criteria of cost and 
viability in policy making and of competence rather than partisan political 
allegiance in personnel selection. In a context where national private and 
philanthropic initiative habitually co-operated with public policy-makers, 
foreign advisers were readily absorbed so long as they worked with 
discretion. The International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation was 
contracted as a philanthropic foundation with a valuable distilled experience 
in countries with problems comparable to those of Colombia in Latin 
America and the Caribbean as well as the US South. Whereas Kemmerer 
made recommendations on all essential aspects of economic policy, 
Rockefeller advice was available only in those areas, like the diffusion of 
scientific knowledge through laboratory development, where the Foundation 
had a recognised specialist knowledge. Thus the pressing problem of reform 
in medical education was the subject of a report which the Medicine Faculty 
contracted from a mission of French advisers, led by Professor Andre 
Latarjet, in 1930. 
The propertied classes financed charitable institutions - hospitals, 
orphanages - that made social inequalities palatable for some and legitimate 
for others. Patriarchal in their conception of government, the propertied 
elites were not averse to more regulation of the disfranchised poor or to 
prescribing authoritarian solutions to groups that lay outside the 'political 
nation', especially if regulation was cheap and, as with European-inspired 
campaigns against venereal diseases in the 1920s, was depicted as an 
instrument promoting and enforcing social discipline. Where an elite 
consensus might be imperilled by a debate over education between 
freethinkers and Catholics, stern clericals were known temporarily to unite 
with unbending anti-clericals in demanding that the state extend its powers of 
moral supervision over conscript soldiers and prostitutes on public hygiene 
issues like syphilis that were alleged to be threatening the national moral 
fibre. Similarly, there was scant resistance to brutally coercive treatment of 
socially stigmatised groups, especially lepers. 
The main charitable institution was the hospital. Hospitals were at the 
heart of traditions of lay and ecclesiastical philanthropy. As in other Catholic 
countries hospital-care grew out of a movement of charitable giving rooted 
in an equation between Christ and the pauper and the commitment of the 
hospital to the suffering poor rather than the charitably sick.92 For Catholics 
the hospital was a means of honouring God, even part of the preparation for 
the afterlife, so that it was appropriate for the religious orders like the 
Hermanas de la Presentation to serve as nurses. In Bogota early republican 
hospital traditions had been connected with military needs.93 In Bogota 
secular philanthropy played a major role, with the wives of anti-clerical 
Liberals providing some of its leadership. In Medellin traditions of Catholic 
welfare provision still dominated in the 1920s, and embraced schools and 
orphanages too. Loosely organised, a system of philanthropy in which upper-
class women took a leading part in fund-raising and management was seen by 
Catholic leaders initially as an answer to secularism and later as a means of 
resisting the challenges posed by early anarchism and socialism. Liberal 
leaders saw private philanthropy as compatible with a growth model stressing 
private enterprise. These differences should not be overdrawn. Philanthropy 
was considered a convenient agency relieving social tension by anti-clericals 
and Catholics of the upper and middle classes, for whom charity was a status-
conscious activity. Philanthropic giving was consistent with a broader stress 
on the personal stewardship of wealth. Hospitals under secular management 
relied heavily on nuns to provide nursing assistance. The relationship of the 
secular and Catholic charities with the civic authorities was roughly the same, 
with charities relieving the public sector of many of its responsibilities. And 
philanthropists played a major part in the selection of staff and management 
of hospitals, in particular the new specialist hospitals, especially for children 
in the first decades of the century. The functions of hospitals were 
repetitiously debated. Was their role only to attend the 'deserving' pious 
poor? Was assisting alcoholics and prostitutes merely perpetuating la mala 
vidal Should the hospital deny aid to poor people who committed sins akin 
to idolatry?94 
The foundation of the first maternity hospitals reflected the beginnings of 
an awareness imported from France that as knowledge of hygiene and 
antiseptics spread so mothers during pregnancy and childbirth could enjoy 
some freedom from discomfort and protection from illness. The early 
maternity hospitals set as their goals a safe and painless delivery for mother 
and child combined with healthy growth and normal development of the baby 
before, during and after birth. The new maternity hospitals were 
complemented by got as de leche, child welfare centres modelled on the 
gouttes de lait founded at Fecamp in France in 1894. (These had been 
preceded by the pioneering L 'Oeuvre de la Maternite at Nancy in 1890, that 
owed its origins to elite concern at the low French birth rate)95 The motives 
behind the foundation of the first Colombian maternity hospitals and gotas de 
leche - pro-natalist in an underpopulated country, eugenic (i.e. 'improving 
the stock' in order to bring about economic development) or humanitarian -
remain to be investigated. 
Outside the hospital sector the most important single voluntary initiative 
was the National Red Cross, which, obtaining legal recognition in 1916, was 
founded by a small group of enthusiasts, three of whom had run an 
ambulance that served the wounded in the Battles of Peralonso and Palonegro 
during the War of the Thousand Days. The national organisation soon won 
international recognition. Though fragile financially, the society survived in 
Bogota and established regional groups of volunteers in Medellin, Cali, 
Manizales and, later, Barranquilla, which from their inception assumed a 
special role in emergencies.96 
From the 1900s some incremental improvements in the education sector 
had repercussions for health care. The use in secondary schools of French 
teaching manuals in the sciences and mathematics, often imported by French 
teaching orders like the Christian Brothers, suggested that medical students 
might obtain a better training in essential disciplines before reaching 
university. The Ministry of Public Instruction acknowledged the importance 
of child hygiene by distributing 9,570 brochures on the subject in 1921 
(compare 19,899 catechisms; 15,600 reading books; and 11,431 arithmetic 
books). From 1913 the ministry also circulated brochures for schoolchildren 
warning against the abuse of alcohol, especially chicha. Notions of hygiene 
were added by some teachers in the course prescribed in the curriculum on 
moral and social conduct and civics. The path-breaking private secondary 
school in Bogota, the Gimnasio Moderno, pioneered sports and swimming 
education. The normales (teacher-training establishments) set out from the 
1910s to persuade schoolteachers of their 'sanitary mission'. And a 
connection was established between the secondary schools for girls and the 
hospitals by the Hermanas de la Presentation, the most important single 
female religious order involved in both secondary education for girls and 
hospital nursing. Particular regions took specific initiatives, notably Boyaca, 
where in the late 1920s an enlightened Conservative reformer, Rafael Bernal 
Jimenez, like Gaitan trained in penal law in Rome, founded a school meals 
service, stressed school hygiene and appointed school doctors as part of a 
broader impetus to public education. The limits to these changes were 
manifest: legislation to make primary schooling compulsory for both sexes 
could not be enforced because there were too few schools and teachers, and 
because the income of many families depended upon child labour; many 
teachers were unqualified; school equipment was poor; salaries were low (the 
school doctors in Boyaca had to double up as criminal pathologists); and the 
impact of reforms in the countryside was felt more in the administrative 
centres (cabeceras) than in the hinterland (veredas). Yet by 1933 even the 
poor department of Boyaca was furnishing medicaments to schools and taking 
the first steps to creating a school dental service.97 
Institutional development in Antioquia illustrated the problems confronted 
by the most prosperous departments. In Medellin a Faculty of Medicine was 
founded in 1871, a mental hospital in 1885, and the municipal cemetery in 
1889. The partial assimilation of a bacteriological model of infectious disease 
was seen in the foundation of a chair of biochemistry in the University of 
Antioquia in 1896. The Academia de Medicina de Antioquia, founded in 
1887, soon acquired a leadership role in the region, establishing norms on the 
handling of epidemics, the construction of dispensaries and the organisation 
of hospitals, and the management of institutions for the mentally ill and leper 
colonies. In one smallpox epidemic, confronted by a shortage of good quality 
vaccines, the Academia required that all public meetings, bullfights and other 
entertainments, processions and religious functions be suspended. Advising 
that practising Catholics should seek good-quality foodstuffs, the Academia 
called too for the suspension of religious vigils and fasts. The aim of the 
Academia was prevention as well as treatment and cure. Subsequent 
epidemiology confirmed that direct contact was the most important means by 
which infection was contracted; but the Academia, determined to protect its 
reputation from criticism, acted prudently to meet traditional beliefs that 
smallpox could move considerable distances through the air.98 The 
Academia also first recommended the pasteurisation of milk in 1896. 
Institutional development was complemented by certain forms of 
entrepreneurial endeavour. Manufacturing growth meant the evolution of new 
consumer products, and urban growth a ready market for cheap manufactured 
goods. Medellin had a soap workshop from the 1870s and a soap factory from 
1885." 
The limits to the Antioqueno performance in health care were outlined by 
the energetic publicist Manuel Uribe Angel, who was recalled in the 1930s 
as the precursor of modern public health policy. He wrote of the Medellin 
hospital in 1881: 'We lack an anatomical amphitheatre, we do not have a 
surgical pavilion; vivisections are unknown among us; laboratories arrive 
among us with peace and depart from us in war...'.100 Even cadavers for 
anatomical teaching were in short supply. Uribe Angel agitated to improve 
conditions on various fronts. He set out to bring an element of permanence 
and institutionalisation to public hygiene and sanitation and to identify the 
appropriate locale for a slaughter-house and impose good hygienic conditions 
upon it. He made a study to determine an appropriate site for a leper colony 
which was not established. He set out to improve the quality of justice by 
forming a group of trained forensic scientists capable of conducting post-
mortem examinations, and worked to establish a permanent medical faculty 
in Medellin where young male Antioquenos without the funds to work in 
Bogota could study. Uribe Angel fought to advance scientific medicine by 
publicising research that indicated that the active agent transmitting malaria 
was the mosquito. And as early as 1872 he sought to instil the habits of 
recording vital public health data by drawing up a simple table of mortality 
and morbidity statistics in the general state hospital in Medellin that showed 
the numbers of patients entering and leaving the hospital by sex, and by rates 
of cure, improvement and death. Yet in 1896 Medellin still possessed no 
library of books on medical subjects, no museum and no natural history 
collection. A climate that favoured a modest expansion of scientific inquiry 
(mainly clinical observations and laboratory work that assisted in the 
diagnosis of disease), a continuous flow of scientific publications and the 
formation of municipal juntas de higiene was possible only when peace 
became permanent after 1902.101 The Academia remained active, making 
its first studies of the contamination of the Rio Medellin in 1914, winning the 
support of alcaldes in 1917 to prevent medical students from opening 
surgeries before graduating, and proscribing the practice of professors of 
medicine granting certificates of knowledge and aptitude to pharmacists and 
popular healers. 
The myth of the Antioqueno frontier crystallised in the 1900s and 1910s. 
It rested heavily on an implicit association of the health, superior nutrition 
and vigour of the raza antioquena and its role in region- and nation-building. 
Any upward trend in nutrition was probably brought about by a broadening 
of the range of commercial and subsistence food products available to frontier 
populations - beans, plantains, yuca, sugar-cane, rice, cacao and coffee. This 
broke with a tradition of overdependence on maize consumption that had 
arisen among mineworkers (mazamorreros) living in areas where the cost of 
living was high because food had to be brought in from outside.102 
Progress in the diagnosis of disease was gradual too. The idee fixe that 
malaria was the consequence of breathing the air was for a long time 
unassailable; and the revisionist orthodoxy that in the marshlands mosquito 
bites were the sole means of transmission of the disease was slow to take 
root. At times the symptoms of malaria, typhoid and paratyphoid were 
confused. One physician diagnosed the symptoms of beriberi in a patient 
correctly, indicating that the specific cause lay in foul water, but adding that 
alcoholic drinks predisposed an ill-nourished patient to illness. A second 
physician accepted the diagnosis of beriberi, but rejected the view that dirty 
water was its cause, arguing instead that the main victims of the disease were 
low-wage day-labourers without the resources to vary a monotonous diet 
based on maize, meat and chocolate and deficient in fresh vegetables.103 
(Beriberi is now recognised to be caused by Vitamin B deficiencies.) 
Sporadic growth provided some opportunities for modest changes in the 
health care sector. Growth on an export-led model meant that external 
pressures provided an important impetus to institutional changes that were 
vital to the flow of exports and imports. State initiative, limited by restricted 
budgets, rested upon a slow and incomplete professionalisation of the national 
administration that was not complemented by a professionalisation of 
departmental and local administration. The institutional focus of care 
remained the hospital. The changing performance of hospitals over the period 
is difficult to assess, though some cause for optimism rests in the gradual 
diffusion of antiseptic and aseptic techniques and procedures and the 
beginnings of maternity hospitals. Otherwise performance was very patchy. 
Official provision of hygiene centres, nurseries and orphanages was uneven 
in the cities and almost unknown outside them. They were the easy victims 
of closure when fiscal retrenchment was demanded. The responsibilities of 
the public sector expanded to include health-provision for the military, some 
state employees and selected groups of skilled urban workers. The limits to 
public provision meant that private provision was crucial. Some private firms 
made health care provision for their workers. Foreign-owned enterprise used 
welfare provision to deflect economic nationalism, improve worker output 
and productivity and project a favourable public image, and national 
enterprise to keep the state at bay, hold onto skilled workers and appease 
worker protest. Hygiene conditions were, like safety conditions at the 
workplace, an important feature of worker struggle in the 1920s; but it seems 
probable as incomes fell and unemployment rose during the World 
Depression that hygiene was a low priority for workers compared to 
guaranteeing survival wages. National philanthropic initiative, seldom 
efficient or effective in its coverage and increasingly unable to respond 
adequately to growing urban populations, was complemented by international 
philanthropic initiative, especially the projects of the Rockefeller Foundation 
whose campaigns against targeted diseases in selected regions consisted of 
packages developed in other countries, which Rockefeller officers tried to 
adapt to local circumstances. Rockefeller-assisted campaigns were imposed 
from above once the approval of local elites had been obtained, without 
consulting the small farmers and rural labourers who were supposed to be 
their main beneficiaries. 
The State, Domestic Trends and External Factors in the 
1930s and 1940s 
During the 1930s Colombia possessed the advantages of stability and 
continuity of political management, which sharply contrasted with the 
upheavals experienced in countries like Cuba and Peru. The crisis of the 
World Depression caused alarm about a possible retreat in social expenditure, 
but did little to slow down trends towards insertion into an international 
political economy of health care and medicine. The largely peaceful transition 
from Conservative to Liberal rule in 1930 gave rise to some optimism that 
when economic recovery occurred the pace of change in social policy could 
be accelerated in line with a reappraisal of spending priorities, not least 
because the governments of Presidents Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-4) and 
Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (1934-8) encouraged a climate of open, informed 
debate, fostered the careers of progressive reformers, especially of the 
younger generation, and perceived social reform as an instrument for 
consolidating Liberal support among newly enfranchised sections of the 
electorate. The early 1930s witnessed a scramble for resources. The limited 
evidence suggests that the public health sector was pushed, albeit 
temporarily, onto the defensive. While public education was a cornerstone of 
the programme of the incoming Liberal administration, health care and 
housing played a smaller part in the plans of Liberal reformers. Though it 
could be a vote-loser during an epidemic, public health was probably not 
going to be a vote-winner; and decision-makers were momentarily tempted 
to divert resources within the ministry of education and salubridad publica 
from public health to education. 
One major and under-studied crisis of the 1930s - the Leticia War against 
Peru (1932-3) - exposed how national security could be jeopardised by poor 
health conditions. Levels of nutrition and general health prevailing among 
conscript troops were inadequate. The armed forces were not ready for 
combat in frontier regions where malaria and beriberi were endemic and 
posed a greater hazard than the Peruvians. Problems of sanitation and 
hygiene in military camps were general. The medical corps, which provided 
temporary employment for young medical graduates in the southern capitals 
during the trough of the World Depression, was too small, untrained and ill-
equipped to be equal to the tasks of warfare. In spite of claims regarding the 
professionalisation of the Colombian army since President Rafael Reyes 
(1904-9) imported an advisory Chilean military mission, there was cause for 
doubting whether the Colombian military had digested the flow of 
information from the 1860s about military hygiene in European specialist 
journals reflecting the experience of the British Army, especially in India, 
and of the French marine infantry, especially in Algeria. The Leticia War, 
together with public protests against falling incomes, high food prices and 
hunger, brought health issues clearly back onto the national agenda; and 
circumstances were propitious to institutional innovation in the military. 
Military hygiene, especially the question of venereal diseases among 
conscript soldiers, had been a matter of public concern and a topic of theses 
by medical students since the 1900s. But from the late 1920s other issues, 
such as civilian fears of a military coup and the oppression of the strike of 
banana workers, had relegated sanidad militar to a minor concern. Civilian 
leaders reticent about increased military spending were persuaded by the 
Leticia War of the need for improved military hygiene. Thus the aftermath 
of the War gave opportunities for specialists in military medicine to press for 
change. One, in particular, rose to prominence. Colonel Jorge Esguerra 
Lopez had entered the army as a sanitary officer in 1910, had studied military 
medicine at the Hospital and the Ecole Militaire du Sante de Val de Grace in 
Paris in 1925-6, and had written on the treatment of knee fractures. Now in 
the late 1930s he founded both the Hospital Militar Central in Bogota and the 
Hospital Naval Esguerra Lopez in Cartagena. 
Recovery from the Depression placed the public health sector back on the 
offensive. The expansion of artisan and factory industry in the mid- and late 
1930s was accompanied by both a growth in worker pressure for improved 
safety and hygiene at the workplace and a growing recognition among 
political and entrepreneurial elites of the desirability of a healthy workforce 
and disease-free cities. A preliminary analysis suggests that public hygiene 
policy during the Liberal Republic was not designed as a major manipulative 
device to incorporate a working-class electorate, except perhaps among port 
and railway workers. The overall trend was probably towards some limited 
tempering of individualistic orthodoxies through paternalistic but permissive 
legislation. The Liberal elite perceived greater efficiency and reorganisation 
rather than an expansion of resources as the key to social amelioration; and 
the viability of collectivistic alternatives was hardly broached. Successive 
Liberal regimes began from the assumptions that private self-reliance should 
be encouraged, that voluntary effort and public charity were solutions for 
personal suffering and family misfortune, and that the role of the state and 
local authorities was strictly limited. The World Depression exposed the 
fragility of an incipient system of public sanitation and hygiene that relied 
heavily on private charity. During previous decades bequests and 
endowments had multiplied, and miscellaneous relief agencies had evolved. 
Policy-makers who in the 1920s had begun to question the wisdom of an 
unregulated flow of misdirected charity and indiscriminate almsgiving that 
could signify a wasteful duplication of effort and competition between 
agencies in one area and a vacuum of initiative in another were alarmed when 
poorly managed charity institutions looked to public support because the flow 
of funds was curtailed during the Depression.104 
The mid- and late-1930s were years of cautious clarification and 
consolidation of trends established in the 1920s, not of revolutionary 
advance. In health issues the first Lopez administration signified no more 
than an attempt to build upon and extend past experience. Food inspection 
practices were further institutionalised. Campaigns against malaria were 
conducted in the Magdalena Valley. More stress was placed on the care of 
mothers and children. State employees received some social security and 
hospital-care assistance through the establishment of cajas de prevision 
social. A programme of salubridad for Choco, a Liberal power-base 
upgraded to the status of a department, was announced. Public health 
initiatives, however, remained at the mercy of political considerations: 
indeed, a trend towards devolving the selection of appointments to the 
departments and municipalities was claimed by ministry bureaucrats in the 
mid-1940s to be responsible for a deterioration of the service provided by the 
urban health centres founded in the 1930s.105 The practices of the period 
were well exemplified by the recommendations of the commission of the 
Academia Nacional de Medicina which acted as a consultative body on public 
hygiene to the incoming Lopez administration in 1934. The recommendation 
on alcoholism and drug addiction (one of ten recommendations), had a 
cautious and prudent thrust, and imposed no new obligations upon the state. 
Industrialists were encouraged to produce a nutritive, lightly stimulant 
popular drink containing no toxic substances. A study of sugar-cane was 
proposed with a view to diverting production from alcoholic drinks to 
industrial purposes. The government was urged to enforce legislation on 
drunkenness vigorously, and also to reduce or suppress taxes on soft drinks 
and beers containing less than five per cent alcohol.106 
In 1936 the National Department of Hygiene acknowledged that public 
policy was systematic only with regard to 'unilateral' campaigns designed to 
combat a particular disease like tuberculosis or 'a cause of racial 
degeneration' like syphilis. The 'unilateral' campaign was valuable in raising 
public awareness about one disease but not others. Hence the desirability of 
forming 'sanitary units' that, using national, municipal and, at intervals, 
departmental resources, would perform a valuable propaganda function. 
'Sanitary units' set out, for example, to stress the imperative of protecting 
children with sa las cunas (nurseries) and got as de leche; to awaken a 
consciousness of the connection between shortages of latrines and the 
existence of tropical anaemia; and to press for the ventilation of classrooms, 
basic hygiene in restaurants and clean tools in hairdressers' shops. The 
salaries of medicos-jefes with broad responsibilities was now devolved to the 
departments; and the importance of appointing qualified social visitors and 
nurses was urged on the local authorities.107 
By 1940 national legislation, enforced and unenforced, covered such 
themes as dog licensing, the killing of rabid dogs and the treatment of their 
victims; the quality of the water supply; hygiene, sanitation and ventilation 
arrangements in breweries and soft drinks factories; the custom of watering 
vegetable gardens with dirty water; basic hygiene in secondary schools and 
the appointment of school doctors; and clean stables. Particular departments 
took additional measures. Antioquia, for example, in 1934 laid down that all 
factories employing more than fifty workers should appoint a doctor with 
supervisory functions. Some municipalities also took unilateral action. By the 
1940s the city of Medellin had a wide range of resolutions covering such 
themes as waste disposal, milk pasteurisation, washing clothes in the Rio 
Medellin, hygiene in the market places, the cleanliness of bars, hotels and 
commercial buildings, the sale of perishable and non-perishable foodstuffs, 
and sanitary conditions in the food-processing sector. Yet a full range of 
progressive legislation was insufficient to preclude the need in 1944 for 
emergency measures to counter the appearance of malaria in recently built 
urban areas of the city.108 
The Director of the National Hygiene department introduced resolutions 
that indicated both a consciousness of the health problems attendant upon 
poor housing and an impotence in handling them. Thus, for instance, in 1934 
owners and tenants were required by law to paint or to whiten the external 
walls of their homes with chalk or sand and to plaster fagades on public 
thoroughfares. Floors, doors and windows were to be washed, and paper 
removed from the walls. Washable tile or brick floors fixed by chalk, cement 
or asphalt were to replace floors made of flattened earth and adobe. Regular 
disinfection was called for, and waste conduits were to be properly 
constituted and kept in good working order. Skylights were to be installed 
where ventilation was poor. A clean bill of health (patente de sanidad) was 
required, and a visiting functionary was empowered both to decide whether 
a home was suitable for occupation and to impose fines for non-compliance. 
As a set of desirable aims and recommendations these resolutions had many 
merits; but as legislation they had few. The authoritarian content of the 
resolution was likely to estrange from the state the many Colombians who 
lacked the resources to act upon it. There were few municipal functionaries 
to implement it, so that enforcement was likely to be exceptional, and at 
times to be interpreted as vindictive and oppressive. The difficulty of 
enforcing this resolution was underlined by another in the following year that 
placed the obligation of enforcement upon national sanitation offices in those 
cities and towns (mainly sea- and river-ports) where they existed.109 
The crisis of the World Depression did much to awaken a concern about 
malnutrition and an awareness of the ways in which malnutrition and an ill-
balanced diet rendered their victims more vulnerable to other, sometimes 
killer diseases. As Contralor-General, Carlos Lleras Restrepo gave an 
impetus to nutrition awareness by establishing cost-of-living indices and 
encouraging modest worker nutrition studies. Innovative studies of the 1930s 
and 40s indicated that while some importance could be attached to culturally 
determined food preferences in explaining dietary deficiencies that lowered 
weakness to disease, pauperism and poverty were more important. Lack of 
regularity and steadiness of employment, fluctuations and differentials of 
wages, and changes in the price and availability of food staples featured 
among the determinants of nutrition levels. So too did shifts away from food 
purchases in the distribution of family budgets which were caused by rising 
rents.110 The more enlightened employers of the 1940s took some ad hoc 
nutrition initiatives for employees, like the provision of balanced meals for 
workers by one furniture factory in Bogota and the supply of school meals for 
the children of oil-workers by Shell. 
The genesis of a modern interest in nutrition was located in the Laboratorio 
Nacional de Higiene. Modern laboratory analysis of foodstuffs and of the 
nutritional composition of diet was possible from 1929. The gravity of simple 
goiter, the main consequence of nutritional deficiency disease, had been 
acknowledged by Boussingault in the 1840s. He had identified the central 
problem, the absence of iodine from salt. Despite the endemicity of goiter in 
an advanced form among the peasantry and rural labour in all Colombian 
regions, no action was taken until Congress legislated in 1947 for the addition 
of iodine to salt and authorised a small increase in its price. This increase was 
intended in part to defray the costs of iodisation and also to support the work 
of the nascent National Institute of Nutrition, which was charged with the 
function of promoting nutritional education and the production of 
nutritionally desirable foodstuffs through regional committees. In the 
countryside nutrition was especially poor. The total calorific intake of rural 
labourers was both insufficient (1,800-2,000 calories per day) and 
inappropriately balanced (80 per cent carbohydrates, 12 per cent fats, 7-8 per 
cent protein). Regional patterns of diet varied considerably but a universal 
scarcity of meat, fish, dairy products, fruit and fresh vegetables was 
observed. Nutritional disorders indicated by surveys conducted by the 
National Institute of Nutrition underlined the significance, in descending 
order, of simple goiter, anaemia among children, nutritional oedema caused 
by low protein intake, dental caries caused by fluoride deficiency, scurvy 
(especially in coastal zones), some pellagra and skin and eye manifestations 
of Vitamin A deficiency. 
One particular issue focused elite concern about nutrition, social discipline 
and the labour supply. The heavy consumption of the maize-based drink 
chicha by rural and urban workers in Cundinamarca and Boyaca made for 
high rates of alcoholism, work absenteeism and mental illness. Early 
nutrition studies exposed a diet that lacked both proteins and vitamins and in 
which chicha played an important calorific part because of its maize content. 
As minister of hygiene Jorge Bejarano used the extraordinary faculties 
available after the bogotazo of 1948 to suppress the chicherias. But just as an 
earlier attempt to convert the chicha-drinking public to the consumption of 
a mild maize-based drink produced in hygienic conditions had failed, so too 
the use of the law to suppress chicha consumption was interpreted as an 
authoritarian offensive against popular culture and proved unenforceable in 
large areas of the country.111 
The impetus given by the first Lopez administration to public education 
and to a climate that fostered a spirit of inquiry into Colombian realities 
(meteorology, topography, economic conditions, cultura aldeana, 
indigenismo) stimulated a resurgence of interest in medical education. At the 
same time the range of health publications expanded: the national newspaper 
El Tiempo ran regular health columns in the 1930s and a health page from 
1946; a scholarly periodical published by the Universidad Nacional acquired 
national prestige and circulation among its graduates; and public health 
specialists edited both a specialist journal and a popular magazine. At the 
regional and city level there were other publications, like the Boletin clinica 
(later superseded by Antioquia medica) in Medellin. Otherwise, limited 
initiatives were taken by municipal elites. Several, during an upsurge of civic 
pride, undertook beautification projects in the plazas that, if aesthetic in 
intent, had incidental health benefits, such as a decline in infectious diseases 
after the removal of obvious filth and a reduction in the number of insects. 
The formation of a public hygiene ministry was several times discussed, 
and, owing largely to war-imposed fiscal constraints, several times deferred. 
In 1947 the ministry was finally established, its first minister being Jorge 
Bejarano, a Liberal widely respected by Conservatives. As minister, 
Bejarano sought out overseas-trained public health specialists who were 
neither politically partisan nor committed to private practice. He emphasised 
the need for appointment of nonpartisan specialists at a departmental level, 
but had little success as political debate became increasingly polarised in the 
late 1940s.112 The ministry assumed the health care functions previously 
discharged within the ministry of work; and Bejarano undertook certain 
specifically targeted campaigns. One such campaign was directed at coca 
production. Seeing the grave consequences of the trade and consumption of 
the coca-leaf, Bejarano sought the cooperation of Bolivian and Peruvian 
colleagues with a view to destroying coca plantations in the Colombian south-
west. The results of this campaign were limited. Traditions of the ceremonial 
use of coca and of open and free sale of dry, toasted coca leaves in Popayan, 
and of part-payment of rural workers in coca leaves were difficult to break. 
Entrenched interests in Cauca pointed to the economic damage inflicted by 
the campaign and to the failure to promote alternative crops as sources of 
income and nutrition.113 
The Bogota hospitals were totally unprepared for an emergency on the 
scale of the urban insurrection of the 9 de abril in 1948. The bogotazo sorely 
tested health arrangements: a besieged government could not co-ordinate an 
emergency medical care programme. On learning of the assassination of 
Gaitan and the crisis that ensued, nurses put on uniforms for protection 
before walking to the hospitals. There was no time for autopsies, only for the 
identification of the dead. One hospital had only one eighteen-year old soldier 
for protection. Some physicians and nurses were unable to reach the 
hospitals: and young doctors and nurses who succeeded in reaching the 
hospital had to learn to cope with the emergency, to take snap, solitary 
decisions, and to handle traumas, not a subject emphasised in medical and 
nursing education. However, the hospital crisis was less severe than was 
feared: the supply of clean water was not disturbed, because no damage was 
done to the aqueduct; there were no electric power cuts; and telephones 
continued to function. Because 9 April was a Friday and purchases were 
habitually made by one hospital on Friday mornings for the following week, 
it at least had sufficient food to provide patients with a small meal and for 
staff to survive on bread and agua de panela.m The lack of trained hospital 
administrators posed special problems during the bogotazo. One medical 
practitioner found the informal training in administration, commerce and 
decision-making that he had received from his father, a banker-businessman, 
invaluable in managing the Hospital San Jose, which alone received over one 
thousand wounded suffering machete, revolver and Mauser wounds during 
the emergency.115 The military command ordered that the streets be cleared 
of the dead because of fear of epidemic; and Red Cross expertise 
followed.116 
External factors played a major part in the changes of the 1930s and 1940s, 
which were decades of deepening international specialisation in medicine. 
New methods of clinical investigation, new surgical techniques and major 
advances in therapeutics (the beginnings in Europe of insulin in 1922, 
sulphonamides in 1935 and blood transfusion services in 1937), offered 
enticing opportunities for enterprising Colombian physicians, who were alert 
to the possibility of career enhancement through pioneering new methods in 
the national milieu, but did not always fully appreciate their cost 
implications. Colombia was further incorporated into the international market 
in health care through membership by Colombians in international societies, 
like the International Leprosy Association, the American Public Health 
Association and the American Society of Tropical Medicine. International 
congresses, which acted increasingly as fora for the diffusion of medical 
knowledge, and occurred with growing frequency during the 1930s, were 
attended by Colombian delegates. To take some examples, Colombia was 
represented at the Congress on Military Medicine and Pharmacy at Madrid 
(1932), the Second Inter American Congress of Cardiology at Mexico City 
(1936) and the South American Congress on Tuberculosis at Buenos Aires 
(1937); at the Fifth International Congress of Radiology at Chicago (1937) 
and the Sixth in London (1950); the First, Second and Third InterAmerican 
Congresses of Radiology in Buenos Aires, Havana and Santiago respectively 
in 1943, 1946 and 1949; and at the World Health Organisation meeting in 
Geneva in 1952. Colombian participation in broader international trends was 
indicated too by the introduction of new surgery. One specialist, for example 
played a vital part in diffusing knowledge of silicosis. Another innovation 
was to form a commission to go abroad and report back on health conditions 
and institutions in other countries, such as leprosy provision in Hawaii. 
The connection with the United States and Canada was strengthened during 
the Second World War. As the Good Neighbor Policy of President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt acquired momentum, some inter-American projects in areas like 
public health and rural colonisation were undertaken as part of a broader 
strategy of hemispheric security that aimed to thwart Fascist, Nazi and 
Francoist aims.117 Until the early 1940s the Pan American Sanitary Bureau 
had been mainly concerned with the maintenance of inter-American 
quarantine regulations and was accused, with some justice, of doing little but 
make noncommittal pious recommendations - for example, that passenger 
ships should be provided with a physician when it was considered necessary. 
In 1940, however, the Bureau acquired teeth. Having arranged internships for 
some Latin American medical students in US public hospitals in 1939, it 
obtained US government funding to establish a programme of fellowships for 
Latin Americans. Eleven Colombians were fellowship beneficiaries between 
1939 and 1943. The Bureau rapidly expanded its activities to promote nursing 
studies and improvements in nursing services, to finance field assignments, 
to take part in bilaterally sponsored campaigns against epidemic diseases, and 
to give a broader stimulus to improvements in Latin American public health 
services. Thus, for instance, the PASB financed the work of a US doctor who 
collaborated with the Colombian hygiene authorities as they tackled an 
outbreak of poliomyelitis.118 Meanwhile, the Servicio Cooperativo 
Interamericano de Salud Publica (SCISP), the local agency of the Institute of 
Inter-American Affairs, under the umbrella of the US Department of State, 
was established in 1942-3. It assisted in building the National Nursing 
School, water treatment plants and hygiene centres, initiatives that were 
undertaken on the understanding that Colombian agencies would later assume 
financial and administrative responsibility for them. One such scheme was 
the Model Hygiene Centre of the river-port of La Dorada, which was founded 
in 1943 and transferred to the hygiene ministry in 1951. The Model Hygiene 
Centre campaigned against parasitical diseases, expanded access to pure 
drinking water, introduced both housing controls and food inspection 
practices, and undertook a campaign to drain infested swamps.119 Funding 
was available from US sources that was complemented by Colombian funding 
for three further urban hygiene centres, port cleansing, techniques of control 
of rickettsian diseases and bartonellosis and some nutritional projects.120 
During the Second World War a handful of Colombians, like other Latin 
Americans, were lured to the United States to fill vacant hospital positions, 
in part owing to a lack of career openings in Colombia.121 
Another shift was in the pattern of imports. Before the Second World War 
medical instruments (such as pincers, and even hospital beds) were imported 
mainly from France and occasionally from Britain. But by 1946 Antioqueno 
purchases were made in the United States: in some respects the US medical 
instrument was an imitation of the French.122 The external ascendancy of 
France was by 1946 clearly in dispute, and the slow recovery of France from 
the Second World War did not restore her pre-eminence in medical 
education, practice and technology in Colombia, not least because the 
Flexnerian model of medical education that prevailed in the United States and 
became general in Latin America by the mid-1950s was applied too in France 
herself. 
Education and Practice in the Health Sciences: 
the 1930s and 1940s 
The significance of the French mission advising on the structure, organisation 
and functioning of the medical faculty in Bogota in 1931 is often understated. 
The French mission was preceded in the 1900s by a German mission to the 
Universidad de Cartagena invited by a German rector, which had no enduring 
nationwide significance.123 Led by Andre Latarjet, the stress of the French 
mission was upon a pragmatic combination of the best of the revised French 
teaching practice of the 1920s and distilled Colombian experience. The 
overall aim was to shape a 'professional culture' and not merely a 
professional competence in medical graduates. A heavy emphasis was placed 
upon converting the Colombian medical establishment to a stress upon 
biological inquiry and laboratory techniques in line with the recent 
modernisation of French teaching practice. Arguing that a spirit of 
investigation was formed mainly in the laboratory, Latarjet and his colleagues 
laid a special accent upon a more intensive use of laboratories, improvements 
in the quality of equipment, better preparation of scientific personnel and the 
evolution of a spirit of inquiry. They did not, however, challenge either the 
primacy of clinical studies or the practice of ward-rounds. A stress was 
placed too upon the connection between study in the laboratory and in the 
operating theatre, and also upon the need for professors to receive salaries 
sufficient to allow them to spend an adequate part of their working week 
discharging their faculty and hospital functions. 
The mission made recommendations regarding the standardisation of 
patterns of recruitment and promotion and pay-scales, in line with the needs 
of hospitals and mental institutions. The role and functions of the team led by 
the university professor were also defined - the assistant professor, 
laboratory assistant, the preparadores and junior personnel like laboratory 
technicians and monitors required in operating theatres. A Plan of Studies 
was drawn up that sought to achieve an effective balance of theoretical, 
practical and clinical studies. Professors were advised to teach by urging 
students to reflect upon their personal knowledge and experience, and not 
merely to comment upon texts. A system of written and oral examination was 
outlined; and a recommendation was made that scholarships overseas be 
placed on a regular basis. 
The content of the syllabus contained several features that merit attention. 
One was a care to stress the biological sciences throughout the education of 
students. Another was an emphasis in the third year on parasitology, 
dermatology and venereology that reflected Colombian conditions, along with 
radiology and physiotherapy. Tropical pathology, radiotherapy, obstetrics 
and child health and hygiene were emphasised in the fifth year, and forensic 
science, toxicology, general hygiene, mental health and the pathology of the 
organs of the senses in the final year. Further recommendations included the 
abolition of one or two chairs in 'infant medicine' and one in obstetrics, with 
the work being done by the new assistant professors of clinical obstetrics. 
These recommendations perhaps reflected a male-centred view of medicine 
that underestimated the significance of the health problems of women and 
children. They may too have embodied a low importance attached to 
paediatrics among French specialists arising from the low birth-rate in 
France. They may eveh have reflected the relatively low population growth 
in Colombia before the 'demographic explosion'. Instead, the Latarjet 
mission recommended the establishment of a chair in the study of respiratory 
diseases which it justified in terms of the scale of the tuberculosis problem, 
the importance attached to it at the teaching Hospital San Juan de Dios, and 
the social significance of the struggle against tuberculosis. The mission 
recommended too the creation of diplomas of higher studies in radiology, 
bacteriology, parasitology, hygiene and tropical diseases, with a view both 
to diffusing a more precise knowledge of common diseases, like childhood 
infections, leprosy, tuberculosis and venereal diseases, and to intensifying 
theoretical and practical knowledge of hygiene, bacteriology and 
parasitology. The overall aim was to produce the several hundred (no more 
precise figure was specified) practitioners needed to fill positions as directors 
and section chiefs of hygiene at all levels, school and military doctors, and 
specialists to handle questions of sanitation, sanatoria, dispensaries, leper 
colonies and port cleanliness. 
Some ancillary recommendations are also worthy of mention. Advances in 
bacteriology, biochemistry, physiology and radiology created a need for 
laboratory accommodation and servicing so that the hospital was no longer 
only a series of wards and an operating theatre. Better conditions, especially 
carefully focused electric light, were needed in the operating theatre of the 
Hospital San Juan de Dios. The study of social anthropology was encouraged, 
embryology should be taught, and an anatomical museum established. And 
there was no need for two professors of descriptive anatomy; one was enough 
for one thousand first-year students in Paris. Meanwhile, the manner in 
which cadavers were transported between the teaching hospital and the 
faculty revealed a grotesque casualness in attitudes to death and the dead in 
Bogota. Latarjet and his colleagues did not share the Colombian appreciation 
of the Mexican popular culture of the danse macabre and its icons - cadaver, 
skull and crossbones. Cadavers were carried through the streets without a 
coffin or crate naked in a cart with their entrails exposed. For Latarjet a 
change in the mode of transport was essential in the interests of hygiene, 
decency, respect for the dead and science - the preservation of the cadaver. 
Furthermore, a decent burial was imperative. The custom of placing the 
remains of dissected corpses in sacks, taking them to the cemetery and 
burying them without any formal ceremony or service should be 
abandoned.124 
The French ascendancy in medical education was reinforced. In the 1930s 
a period of six years of study followed by one year as an intern was required. 
In order to graduate the intern had to demonstrate his skills in the 
management of patients who were located in designated beds under his 
supervision and to write a thesis that he had to defend before a jury. The 
student had the right to choose a hospital or clinic before its preparation. 
Textbooks in French were widely used; the prevailing French terminology, 
for example 'external practitioner', was adopted. Colombians even used the 
expressionpathologie exotique (patologia exotica) in referring to 'tropical' 
diseases. The impact of Latarjet was to reinforce and acclerate existing 
trends, especially the upgrading of medical practice in the provinces by 
maintaining a flow of graduates of regional origins who returned to the 
provinces on graduating. 
Medical education had clear limitations. Much learning was by rote and 
recitation. All subjects were secondary to descriptive anatomy; and in 
physiology there was no contact with the living human body, only with 
hamsters. The professor actively engaged in research was a rarity (and a 
prominent paediatrician educated at Harvard University lacked the modern 
facilities necessary to pursue his specialism). There was some disquiet too 
that, despite the broadly scientific thrust of the Latarjet recommendations, 
there survived a powerful tendency to sacrifice a spirit of scientific inquiry 
to the pursuit of sabiduria, and for intellectual scepticism and doubt to be 
suffocated by an unimpeachable professional mistica. Entrenched attitudes 
had a peculiar obduracy; thus, because the study of anatomy continued to 
enjoy a high esteem, the discovery of a muscle similarly enjoyed prestige. 
Meanwhile, the absence of a selection procedure in the 1930s meant that all 
student applicants successful in the school-leaving examination (bachillerato) 
were admitted. The number matriculated rose from less than one hundred in 
the early 1930s to four hundred a decade later, a figure that placed impossible 
pressures on restricted laboratory space. In the early 1940s no clinical 
histories were written in the teaching hospital, and only the names and 
temperatures of patients were recorded. To be recognised as a professor of 
the National University was the highest honour for a medical practitioner and 
invaluable in building a clientele. Because infallibility was inextricably 
associated with professorial status, no autopsies could be conducted on 
hospital patients because professors feared a loss of their authority among 
students when an autopsy contradicted their earlier diagnosis. Political and 
social liberalisation in the 1930s did not extend as far as any relaxation of 
discriminatory attitudes against stigmatised groups like alcoholics and 
prostitutes. Lack of access to French exports from 1940 meant that professors 
had to look elsewhere for books. To some extent Argentine texts, often based 
on French, German, British, Italian and Spanish works, filled the gap.125 
Entry to the medical profession presupposed a good secondary education 
and sufficient resources to study in Bogota, Medellin or Cartagena for longer 
than for law or pharmacy. Thus physicians came with barely an exception 
from the middle and upper classes, and young men - and, from the 1940s, 
young women - constrained by financial considerations chose to enter less 
prestigious and less costly careers like pharmacy and nursing. Older 
generations of medical doctors, who were concerned that young graduates 
should obtain gainful employment commensurate with their qualifications, 
were also anxious that the profession should not lose status by lowering entry 
standards to the faculties, shortening the period of study before qualifying, 
or reducing the scientific content of teaching. The theme of the social origins 
of the professions should be treated with caution, because Colombia was as 
regionally divided in terms of social structure as in patterns of wealth and 
power. Some considerable social fluidity was seen in areas of economic 
dynamism, like the Antioqueno frontier, the major ports and Bogota itself. 
Here the new professionals - physicians, engineers and architects - found 
limited opportunities for employment and for social ascent in phases of 
growth like the mid- and late 1930s; and those who had established a niche 
retained it, if with difficulty, in periods of stagnation such as the early 1940s. 
By contrast, regions of little growth with rigid social and ethnic barriers, like 
Cauca, Narino and most of Boyaca, offered few opportunities for young 
professionals. Here the middle classes were smaller, less secure, often 
disunited and heavily dependent on the upper class for employment. They 
were not uniformally progressive. Official positions which were created in 
periods of expansion were left unfilled or suppressed in phases of 
contraction. Private practice required a certain entrepreneurship which many 
physicians lacked; and the economic basis of private practice outside the 
departmental capitals was extremely precarious. Thus boyacense physicians 
sometimes decided to remain in Bogota, or, as rail and road communications 
improved, kept surgeries in Bogota and a boyacense municipio and commuted 
between them. Caucano medical graduates too, especially from the 1940s, 
migrated to the lusher pastures of the Valle del Cauca, and occasionally to 
Bogota. 
No one nationwide pattern in the evolution of the profession can be 
identified. But certain trends can be detected. While large urban enterprises 
were required by law to employ a medical graduate, hacendados seldom 
employed a physician. They were not required by law to do so; they saw few 
financial gains in employing physicians, and felt few social obligations 
towards tenant farmers and rural labourers. Some considerable social 
distance separated the physician from the landed interests. A defensive 
indifference among large landowners was compounded by a priority among 
most governments that intricate rural power structures should not be 
disturbed by intruders and that the agricultural sector upon which export 
revenues and urban food supplies depended should not be offended. Health 
professionals were often in the vanguard of middle-class coalitions that 
struggled to overcome obstacles to social change; and where they succeeded, 
this was often because they co-operated with other professions that were 
similarly struggling for recognition. Gradually medical doctors saw the 
benefits to be gained from employing a professional architect to design a 
hospital and a professional engineer to oversee the construction of its water 
supply and its arrangements for electric energy, sewage and drainage. 
Similarly, architects and engineers used the services of medical 
professionals, with whom they had complementary professional interests in 
the cleansing and reconstruction of the water supply in the cities, the building 
of new housing with good ventilation, adequate bathrooms and hygienic 
kitchens, as well as the extension of drainage and sewage arrangements to 
new suburbs. Engineer-entrepreneurs on the railways came by the 1940s to 
see the advantages in hiring a young physician to assure that scarce skilled 
workers were healthy; and physicians co-operated with sanitary engineers, 
and in the 1930s, with the first generation of 'social visitors' (later social 
workers), in campaigns to curtail diseases. In their attempts to promote 
values of personal and collective sanitation and hygiene especially among 
labour and schoolchildren, urban and rural, the medical profession worked 
cordially with the traditional professions - lawyers, military officers and 
especially teachers and the parish clergy - when their involvement in local 
issues was not interpreted as an interference or an irrelevance. In their 
struggle for recognition physicians could depend upon the support of the 
more far-seeing members of the upper class, represented in power by such 
pragmatically progressive figures as Presidents Pedro Nel Ospina (1922-6), 
Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-4), Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (1934-8 and 1942-
5) and Eduardo Santos (1938-42), who allowed them a wide measure of 
discretion within small budgets. But physicians complained bitterly at the 
obstructive myopia of entrenched interests in the municipal governments of 
Barranquilla, Medellin and especially Bogota, and also among latifundistas 
and mine-owners whom they held responsible for various avoidable outbreaks 
of epidemics. 
The practice of medicine graduates taking specialist studies abroad after 
qualifying from the medical faculties of the Universidad Nacional and the 
Universidad de Antioquia grew. An occasional graduate studied abroad after 
qualifying at the Universidad de Cartagena; and young men from the south-
western departments opted frequently to study in Ecuador at the Universidad 
de Quito before returning to practise their profession in Cauca and Narino. 
Some graduates of regional origins, especially those from Antioquia, 
returned from the Universidad Nacional to practise in their home 
departments; but a significant number, especially from the eastern 
departments, opted to settle in Bogota, given the lack of opportunities to 
practise specialisms except in tropical medicine outside the capital city. 
At intervals there were moves to promote professional cohesion among 
medical doctors by instilling a professional ethic in students, redefining 
professional values in the light of changing circumstances and diffusing 
professional publications. Nevertheless, there evolved profound differences 
within a highly stratified profession: between those trained overseas and the 
majority that was not; between the prestigious figure in the capital city 
attending the upper class and the small-town practitioner; between 
generations; and between specialisms. There were not the clear hierarchies 
that existed among the clergy and military, which avoided some of the bad-
tempered public wrangling for which the clergy were renowned. However, 
there was certainly more professional coherence than among lawyers and 
probably more than among engineers and architects, so that the medical 
profession was able to make a more coherent impact on policy than other 
professions within its own area of competence but had slight impact 
elsewhere. Usually recoiling from public agitation, which medical leaders 
saw as inconsistent with their status and likely to boomerang, the professional 
elite tended to opt for quiet lobbying combined with judicious and 
unhistrionic press coverage. Generally physicians, like military officers until 
the mid 1940s and unlike lawyers and the clergy, stood apart from day-to-day 
politics. A prudent aloofness opened them to charges of introspection, which 
seemed confirmed as 'medical families' took shape. 
An analysis of career patterns126 indicates that until the Fall of France in 
1940 Paris was the preferred destination of most ambitious young would-be 
medical specialists. A few studied and undertook internships elsewhere: at, 
for example, the Royal College of Surgeons in London. One studied at Lyons 
before specialising in tropical illnesses and urinary tracts at the Instituto E. 
Marchafera in Rome during the Second World War; a handful studied 
bacteriology and tropical medicine in Brussels, a secondary centre of the 
subject thanks to the Congolese connection; one Antioqueno studied surgery 
at the Martin Luther Hospital in Berlin in 1942 while completing his studies 
at the university; another from Bucaramanga studied in Frankfurt, Berlin and 
Munich, specialising in gynaecology. Spain had few attractions, in spite of 
a treaty recognising professional qualifications as equivalent.127 A few 
medical practitioners studied urology at Barcelona; and particular professors 
acted as magnets to disciples: Gregorio Maranon, a prominent pathologist, 
in Madrid; and later Jose and Ignacio Barraquer and Hermenegildo Arruga, 
ophthamologists, in Barcelona. But Spain was seldom a destination of 
Colombian students (the dictum No hay ciencia en Espana is still to be 
heard). Some students combined studies in different countries: undertaking 
undergraduate studies in Belgium, Spain or the French regions before 
specialising in Paris; studying both at the Tropical Institute in Hamburg and 
the IberoAmerican Institute in Berlin before moving to the Institut Colonial 
or the Institut des Maladies Tropicales in Paris. By the 1940s there was some 
disquiet that French and Spanish qualifications were often specious, that it 
was possible for a student to return with certificados de asistencia that 
carried more prestige than they merited.128 
New trends can be observed in the early 1940s. One was a growth of study 
in the United States. A trickle of students took postgraduate studies of their 
own volition in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s. But the closure of 
European, especially French study opportunities, combined with the growing, 
if admittedly limited, availability of scholarships and fellowships for Latin 
Americans, especially from the Rockefeller and Kellogg Foundations and the 
Pan American Sanitary Bureau, to study in the United States, expanded 
numbers in the late 1930s and especially the 1940s. Their destinations varied 
considerably.129 A small number of students, in, for example the pathology 
of tuberculosis, studied elsewhere in Latin America before studying in the 
United States. One distinguished exception, later a minister of hygiene, 
studied in Canada at the Montreal Neurological Institute before moving to the 
Neurological Institute of New York; and a radiologist (not a graduate of 
medicine) studied at the School of Tropical Medicine at the University of 
Puerto Rico which was affiliated to Columbia University. 
Exposure to new external models deepened anxieties. One concern, evident 
especially among US-trained medical specialists, was the level of science 
prevailing amongst the older generation of surgeons and professors. There 
was a disquiet that surgical technique took priority over patient care and 
surgical results. One pathologist, trained at Johns Hopkins University in 
Baltimore, who has sometimes been claimed to have placed pathology in 
Colombia on a scientific basis, returned to the Universidad de Antioquia to 
campaign from 1944 for the need to verify clinical observations through 
laboratory examination. He examined discarded appendices to establish 
whether the patient had suffered from appendicitis or an inflamed appendix, 
or to clarify whether a patient was suffering from typhoid fever, colitis or 
amoebiasis, the last of which did not appear in French textbooks. He tried to 
rectify the anomaly that, despite the centrality of anatomical diagnosis in the 
curriculum, medical students were more conversant with working with 
cadavers than pathological anatomy. In a series of lectures on clinical 
pathology he insisted on the need for study of all the organs of the patient, 
regardless of knowledge accumulated in prior examinations and surgery, and 
the collection of precise information - clinical histories, autopsies, the dates 
of laboratory tests. 
A new generation of graduates could challenge the presumed infallibility 
of prestigious surgeons, whose claims could be refuted with scientific 
evidence; and a more accurate assessment of patterns of disease based upon 
more precise statistics of mortality and morbidity could be reached.130 In 
the mid-1940s recipients of scholarships abroad returned to work in the 
epidemiology service, the phytopathology (plant disease) service and the 
experimental agricultural station at Roldanillo, Valle. Yet there was concern 
that scholars in public health trained abroad were not contractually bound to 
practise it on their return, and that some were even compelled to enter private 
practice for lack of public employment resulting from wartime fiscal 
stringency. 
A major secondary trend of the 1940s, the significance of which was 
probably underestimated in the 1960s and 1970s, was to study elsewhere in 
Latin America. Particular institutions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 
and Uruguay, which had acquired a continent-wide celebrity for their 
specialist work, flourished within the framework of reformist and populist 
experiments. Colombian students of middle-class origins and with few 
opportunities to learn foreign languages more difficult than Portuguese were 
drawn to study paediatrics and neurosurgery in Santiago, nutrition, 
orthopaedics, traumatology and the study of digestive and genito-urinary 
tracts in Buenos Aires, yellow fever studies in Rio de Janeiro, and 
cardiology, obstetrics and gynaecology in Mexico City. 
The impact of study elsewhere in Latin America, especially the Southern 
Cone, was profound. Postgraduates educated in Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay encountered a medicine that was less elaborate than that in the 
United States and that some believed provided a more appropriate model for 
Colombia. Paediatricians, for example, admired what some described as a 
'Latin American pathology' well adapted both to the limited resources of 
Colombia and to social conditions in which parasitical diseases and 
malnutrition were rife and therefore merited emphasis. In the eyes of 
Colombian postgraduates studying neo-natology, nephrology and paediatrics, 
Chilean and Uruguayan medicine had a particular appeal. Chilean medicine 
had a large European (especially German) component with a strong emphasis 
upon patient-centred low-cost investigation and treatment. Santiago had 
teaching hospitals where clinical histories were meticulously recorded, where 
all patients that died received autopsies, and where students experienced 
small-class teaching. On graduating Chilean physicians were required to 
work in the public sector for four hours per day for three years. 
Paediatricians, in particular, were impressed by the importance attached to 
the speciality and to the way it strengthened the notion of the 'family doctor' 
who transcended specialisms. Both Chilean and Uruguayan medicine were 
conducted within a framework of strong political commitments to social 
welfare improvement, and the public health sector received clear ministerial 
leadership. Moreover, university professors, notably in paediatrics, were 
imbued with a powerful sense of community commitment. Thus, from 
Uruguay was brought to Medellin the idea that a mother should be 
encouraged to remain with her ill child in hospital.131 In the 1930s a small 
group of Antioquenos had gone to Argentina to study respiratory diseases and 
tuberculosis. For the new generation tuberculosis had romantic connotations 
combined with the allure of new technology.132 While particular Argentine 
institutions and teachers were admired by Colombian postgraduates, they 
believed Argentine hospitals and faculties to be weakened and distorted from 
the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s by peronista patronage politics.133 
New medical faculties began to appear in the confessional universities in 
the 1940s. The Society of Jesus and the Archdiocese of Medellin were 
cautious about establishing medical faculties associated with the Universidad 
Javeriana in Bogota and the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana in Medellin, 
principally because a medical faculty was a heavy investment and failure 
would reflect badly upon the Church. There was no particular Catholic thrust 
behind the evolution of the medical faculty at the Universidad Javeriana. The 
main stated motives behind its foundation were to enhance the reputation of 
the university and to arrest a perceived decline of medical ethics. 
Conservatives and Catholics expressed alarm that control of medical 
education was slipping into the hands of the Liberal left in the Universidad 
Nacional during the 'Marxist' rectorship of Gerardo Molina, and were 
angered by the influence wielded over limited student places at the university 
by a woman psychologist and Communist refugee from Spain, Carmen 
Rodrigo. Protests, some of them from professors of the Universidad Nacional 
whose sons were excluded because the admissions regulations were enforced 
inflexibly, culminated in a small group of professors making an approach to 
Padre Felix Restrepo, the Jesuit rector of the Universidad Javeriana and the 
outstanding Colombian ideologue of Catholic corporatism. They argued that 
it was imperative to found a medical faculty where all students attended 
compulsory classes in Catholic morals and ethics and where Marxists and 
Communists had no influence. The teaching priorities of the Society of Jesus 
were theology, philosophy and law; and medicine was not an area in which 
it had a special interest. However, the proposal was put in such a way that the 
Jesuits could hardly resist it, even given the practical problems - a 'colonial 
cloister' for accommodation where laboratories had to be improvised, and the 
lack of an operating theatre. The first dean of the new faculty had briefly 
been dean of the national faculty, and faithfully emulated the teaching 
programme of the Universidad Nacional. 
The Universidad Javeriana was open to two criticisms: that the faculty was 
founded out of personal pique cloaked in an intellectual rationale; and that the 
Society of Jesus, committed to teaching, had no commitment to the evolution 
of public health services for the less privileged sectors of society. The 
corollary of a medical faculty, namely a teaching hospital, was an expensive 
proposition, which the Society resisted, instead encouraging the faculty to 
make contracts with private and public hospitals for the study of clinical 
surgery, as well as obstetrics and gynaecology. When a commission of 
students protested to Padre Restrepo that they felt limited by the absence of 
a teaching hospital, and that they were compelled to travel long distances to 
attend few patients, Restrepo replied that the state would not allocate 
resources to a private institution and that the Society of Jesus could not fund 
a hospital. Having calculated the relative costs and benefits of making 
payments to other hospitals for assistance to its students and of building its 
own, the Society opted for the former.134 In Medellin in spite of claims that 
teaching at the Universidad de Antioquia was out-of-date, the first attempt to 
establish a confessional medical faculty failed after one year, and its students 
were transferred to the Universidad Javeriana.135 
A pharmacy school intended to supply the need for pharmacists to 
compound and dispense medicines was founded as a dependency of the 
medicine faculty of the National University. As in medicine the main 
influences were French, and a handful of postgraduates studied in 
Montpellier, Paris and Lyons. During the 1930s student pressure enlarged the 
curriculum so that it included more scientific content, and the period of study 
before graduating was extended from two to four years. The school became 
a faculty that enjoyed more independence: but its functions remained the 
same - to develop a small corps of professional pharmacists, with a status 
inferior to the physician, who would elaborate pharmacopoeial formulae from 
books giving directions for their preparation. Practical experience in 
weighing, mixing and compounding drugs was obtained in the pharmacy of 
the teaching hospital.136 A prominent trained pharmacist, who acquired 
professional qualifications at Lyons and Clermont-Ferrand between 1931 and 
1934, became founder-dean of the pharmacy faculty of the Universidad 
Nacional, a member of the national committee controlling the price of 
pharmaceutical products during the Second World War, founder-manager of 
a pharmaceutical enterprise, the author of a compilation of pharmaceutical 
legislation and the director of the journal of the pharmacy faculty at the 
Colegio Nacional de Farmaceuticos. One pharmacy graduate of the 
Universidad de Antioquia, who did postgraduate study in Brazil and 
Argentina, went on to be Inspector General de Salubridad of the departments 
of the Caribbean coast between 1934 and 1936 and managing director of 
Picot Laboratories in 1938. Among other activities he established the 
technical division of the joint Colombian-Brazilian enterprise Incobra 
(Instituto cientifico colombo-brasileiro), which aimed to substitute Latin 
American products for imported medical-laboratory products. His career 
illustrated the beginnings of a major shift among pharmacy graduates. In the 
1930s and early 1940s their ambition was usually to establish a pharmacy 
business where they sold drugs that they compounded themselves. By the 
mid-1950s the general trend was for pharmacy graduates to be employed as 
salesmen to retailers without a formal pharmacy training who sold pre-
formulated pharmaceuticals produced and packaged by national subsidiaries 
of transnational firms. These trends were accompanied by a growth in self-
prescription of mass-produced proprietary remedies and the beginnings of 
pharmacy chains. 
The professionalisation of nursing was a recurring theme of public debate; 
but little enduring achievement was evident till the 1940s. A nursing school 
founded in 1905 in Cartagena by a professor who had worked with 
professional nurses in France had come to nothing, because it was proscribed 
by the Archbishop of Cartagena on the grounds that it challenged the 
monopoly of care of the religious orders.137 Discussion of Rockefeller-
assisted nursing education in the late 1920s was aborted by the World 
Depression. The nurses trained in the late 1930s by the national organisation 
of the International Red Cross in accordance with its international statutes 
had difficulty in obtaining official recognition of their qualifications. Some 
ad hoc courses in nursing were arranged in the light of recommendations for 
a bachillerato for girls drawn up after a German pedagogic mission advised 
on a curriculum and the training of women teachers. 
In the 1940s, however, the position in nursing changed significantly, 
thanks to a series of initiatives to train senior nurses for teaching and higher 
staff positions and to establish hierarchies of auxiliary nurses, midwives and 
health visitors. Both Rockefeller and official US-PASB advice and funding 
complemented Colombian initiative in the first stages of a programme to 
consolidate a modern base in nursing education that took twenty-five years 
to complete.138 The Dean and several professors of the Nursing School 
(later Faculty) at the Universidad Nacional were from the United States and 
Canada between 1945 and 1958. Such external influences signified the 
introduction of a regimen meting out discipline in the tradition of Florence 
Nightingale. Duty, deference, order, sanitarian ideals and practical work 
were extolled, along with the sexual division of labour. A stress on character-
training and the monitoring and regulation of the behaviour of student nurses 
marked them off from other students until the early 1970s. Students of 
nursing were rigidly segregated from male students, including medical 
students, even for the teaching of microbiology. 
New legislation in 1946 was designed to end the certification of nurses by 
hospitals or physicians on the basis of on-the-job experience, to replace it 
with formal education and professionalisation, and to establish clear 
categories of General Nurse, Hospital Nurse, Auxiliary Nurse, Nurse-
Midwife and Health Visitor. However, the implementation of these decisions 
was impeded by the absence of schools of nursing - only that of the 
Universidad Nacional was officially recognised - with the consequence that 
several self-styled private 'nursing schools' came into existence. A shortage 
of nursing professionals competent to teach meant that results in nursing 
schools outside Bogota were 'something less than deficient'.139 Other 
obstacles to the evolution of a professional body of nurses included the 
ambiguous status connotations of nursing and domestic labour and fears of 
middle-class parents for the safety of their daughters in hospitals -
institutions inhabited by the poor and destitute where men and disease were 
rife.140 Hospital work was acceptable to a patriarchal society only because 
a cloistered regimentation assured a compliance with normative behaviour 
and the hospital was seen as an extension of the domestic boundary. Other 
factors favoured the rise of modern nursing: a determination among civilian 
elites to feel and be part of the West in the post-war order; pressures from 
middle-class women of capital city and provincial origins for professional 
openings; the pressures too of progressive physicians concerned to raise the 
quality of attention and management; and the manifest inadequacies of care 
and administration in the hospitals as cities grew. Among the first nurses and 
'social visitors' were daughters and nieces of physicians. 
Nursing became a theme fuelling tensions between the religious orders and 
lay professionals. At times anticlerical laypeople alleged that self-trained 
nuns, entrenched in senior positions, placed the priorities of their orders - for 
example, unfailing religious attendance at 6 pm - higher than attention to 
patients. They were accused too of attaching more importance to an 
appearance of discipline - keeping buildings and equipment neat and locking 
objects up - than to science - precision in measuring doses, giving injections 
punctually, applying sterile techniques conscientiously and arranging 
instruments and medications expertly. Anti-clericals claimed that some nuns 
insisted that young women in labour should not be given prophylactics to 
reduce their pain because the mother had sinned in order to have the 
child.141 The religious orders and their allies answered by arguing that since 
nuns were not preoccupied with the length of the working day and had no 
competing commitments like family obligations, their dedication to patient-
care and hospital administration was unswerving and complete. Moreover, 
they continued, since nuns did not work for a salary, there was more 
personnel stability in hospitals run by them because they were not tempted by 
better remunerated positions. Nursing teaching at the Universidad Javeriana, 
evolving from cursos de hogar that emphasised first aid and domestic 
management142 came about as a response to fears of lay hegemony at the 
Universidad Nacional and the lay challenge to Catholic control of nursing 
practice. Lay nurses distancing themselves from the partisan attachments of 
the 1940s and 1950s today concede that the religious orders provided useful 
examples of discipline and community work, which, in Bogota, were partly 
lost. 
In Medellin the Hermanas de la Congregation responded to the lay 
challenge by professionalising themselves, some of them attending courses 
in nursing at Catholic universities in the United States. The main initial 
impetus to a nursing school came from a French nun, Therese des Anges, and 
a group of eleven Hermanas de la Presentation, who, backed by the Dean of 
the Medical Faculty of the Universidad de Antioquia, used the syllabus and 
experience of the nursing faculty of the Universidad Nacional as a 
professional yardstick while resorting to the discipline of their order so as to 
establish a mistica de profesion.143 In Cartagena by 1950 conditions had 
altered, and the power of the Church diminished. Professional nursing at the 
new university nursing school was more socially acceptable than in the 
uplands, and recruited prominent women like wives of the leaders of the 
dockers unions. The advocates of modern nursing won public support from 
women journalists and some backing from the departmental and city 
authorities, but encountered resistance from entrenched interests in the 
medical profession.144 Throughout Colombia opportunities for nursing 
employment were limited. The first generation of professional nurses worked 
for the most part with medical practitioners in private work and in health 
centres, and not in the hospitals. By 1950, because professional and patient 
pressures prompted hospital directors to appoint graduate nurses in order to 
improve the training of nursing auxiliaries and to raise the quality of 
attention, the place of qualified nurses in hospitals was better 
established.145 
Few career openings existed for women even in the health care sector 
before the 1940s. Two exceptions to this general observation stand out. One 
nurse, born in Medellin in 1916, who studied with the nuns of the Instituto 
de la Presentation in Medellm between 1938 and 1942, was active in local 
charity and philanthropic organisations - the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas, 
Junta Directiva Pro-Mendicidad de Antioquia and Sociedad Civica Manuel 
Jose Cayzedo - and contributed to the building of the municipal maternity 
clinic of Medellin and two pavilions in the Casa de Pobres of the adjacent 
town of Belencito. Another nurse who joined the Red Cross as a volunteer in 
1928 and served the armed forces during the Leticia War in Caqueta was 
briefly director of the nursery of both the Bavaria Brewery and the central 
market place in Bogota. In the late 1940s new career opportunities were made 
available with the beginnings of the national social security institution, the 
ICSS (Instituto Colombiano de Seguros Sociales). Nursing teams - a qualified 
nurse accompanied by an auxiliary - were soon identified by the medical 
leadership of the ICSS as having explanatory skills often lacked by doctors, 
that could be used to bridge any gap between professionals and workers and 
small businessmen. The ICSS management assigned nurses various roles. 
They were expected to explain the significance of the ICSS to affiliated 
workers, to dispel the image of hospitals as preparatory stages before death 
and to undertake vaccination campaigns against, smallpox among shop, 
brewery and chocolate factory workers. They encouraged pregnant women 
to seek attention from the maternity services before childbirth and taught 
mothers about breast- and bottle-feeding and the upbringing of infants.146 
A small number of new opportunities in nutrition offered openings for 
professional women. One, in particular, after specialist studies in Buenos 
Aires, returned as a university professor of nutrition, undertaking pioneering 
studies of dietary patterns of personnel in the national police and 500 
'standard families', while also working in the Laboratorio de Nutrition y 
Alergia. One of the first social workers associated with the Nursing School 
undertook specialist courses in Argentina and Chile. 
The history of nursing in its first stages in Colombia was not that of a gran 
lucha, but of gradual evolution.147 Far from posing a challenge to the 
entrenched hierarchies within the health care professions, the first generation 
of professional nurses accommodated and reinforced them. Inhibited by 
patriarchal constraints from above and differences among women, especially 
between the lay and ecclesiastical sectors, nursing practice did not break 
down barriers of status among health workers. The fact that graduate nurses 
were outnumbered by medical doctors gave nurses the value of scarcity, 
which they could use to establish a niche in a rapidly evolving status quo. But 
gender prejudices remained potent. 
The main features of medical practice included a tendency towards the 
concentration of specialist knowledge and care in Bogota and, to a lesser 
extent, Medellin, where specialist facilities existed. A proclivity existed 
among medical practitioners to gravitate to the urban centres where private 
practice was profitable, and better opportunities for the schooling of their 
children beckoned. And there was a marked propensity among medical 
faculties, following external examples, to train specialists rather than general 
practitioners. A growth in the number of professional organisations reflected 
both growing self-confidence and trends towards specialisation within the 
profession. Thus the broad-based Federation Medica Colombiana and 
Colegio Medico de Cundinamarca were established by the mid-1940s, 
together with specialist societies in such areas as respiratory diseases, 
radiology, obstetrics and gynaecology, and work medicine. These societies 
sometimes had their own specific connections with philanthropic 
organisations like the Sociedad de San Vicente de Paul and Sociedad de 
Mejoras Publicas, the Asociacion de Medicos Catolicos Colombianos, and 
such local bodies as the Club Rotario of Cartagena and the Junta de 
Asistencia Social of Popayan. The modernisation of professional education 
and practice among physicians did not meet the needs of most of the poor 
who lacked the resources to enjoy 'modern' provision: as previously, 
measures to curtail the activities of curanderos could only offend those 
groups who depended on their services. And, indeed, a marked unevenness 
between sub-sectors within health care existed (a precocious record in cancer 
but an unimpressive one in malaria, for example), which was to some extent 
merely a national manifestation of an international phenomenon, but could be 
explained too by particular domestic factors, like a willingness to spend 
official funds upon leprosy rather than upon intestinal diseases. 
The precocious record of Colombia in public sector cancer research and 
treatment occurred because Colombian students were exposed to French 
pioneering in cancer. Effective pressure within the civilian elite of a small 
core of specialists with managerial skill and a dedicated commitment to 
institutional innovation assured the genesis of a modern cancer service during 
the late 1920s. On returning from Paris where he won recognition from the 
Academie de Medicine for his discovery of the Pasta Colombia (1920-4) and 
was a laboratory assistant at the Institut de Radium, Alfonso Esguerra Gomez 
founded the radiotherapy service of the Hospital de San Juan de Dios in 1928. 
Following a French advisory mission the Instituto de Radium was founded 
between 1930 and 1934 as a dependency of the Universidad Nacional, 
modelled largely upon the institutes of radium founded in Paris in 1909 and 
in London and Manchester in 1914. The practice of diagnostic radiology and 
radiotherapeutics using X-ray installations which gave physicians 
opportunities to examine the internal anatomy of patients without recourse to 
surgery was well established internationally by the 1930s. In Colombia new 
career opportunities arose with new specialisations. With radiology came new 
positions for interns in the radiodiagnosis services at the Hospitals of San 
Juan de Dios and La Misericordia in Bogota and the lazareto of Agua de Dios 
in the 1930s. New openings were found for young specialists in small cities 
like Girardot and Armenia in the 1940s. 
Career possibilities for young graduates expanded in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The quality of public health personnel was limited by a high turnover in many 
positions in the public sector, especially at departmental and city level, which 
resulted from poor remuneration, the prevalence of short-term contracts and 
political pressures. In the philanthropic sector, efficiency was at times 
impaired by the frequency of part-time, honorific positions, such as regional 
chief of the National Red Cross. New appointments were made at national, 
departmental and municipal levels and by private enterprise.148 
Medical practice reflected broader patterns outside the large cities. In a 
provincial capital like Pasto the family doctor often received payment in kind, 
usually chickens and other produce, from peasant clients. He had his own 
pharmacy where his wife and children helped to prepare medicines, and he 
showed an interest in botany.149 In Tunja in the 1930s professional practice 
was hardly different. For the incipient middle class and some artisans the 
medical practitioners was a family friend with an intimate knowledge of the 
medical and psychological history of the family. Seldom was he consulted at 
the early stages of an illness, since professional attention was considered 
justified only when the condition of the patient had deteriorated seriously. 
Because few patent drugs were fabricated in laboratories, most were made up 
by pharmacists. Nuns played a vital role as midwives and nurses and as 
managers of orphanages and asylums. Because the charity hospital was 
acknowledged as the antesala de muerte, the more prosperous classes were 
cared for at home and nuns were sent to work in it as a punishment.150 
Changing Patterns of Disease: the 1930s and 1940s 
In the late 1940s the main killer diseases remained the same as before. In 
1946, according to official statistics, there were 160,460 recorded deaths in 
Colombia; 36 per cent of death certificates were signed by a physician. The 
leading diagnosed causes of death were diarrhoea, enteritis, etc., 19,671; 
congenital malformations and premature births, 14,201; pneumonia and 
bronchial pneumonia, 10,657; and bronchitis, 9,166. Heart diseases (all 
forms), malaria, nephritis and tuberculosis (all forms) each represented 
between 4,000 and 5,999 deaths; accidents (other than motor vehicles), 
cancer (all forms), whooping cough, measles, typhoid and paratyphoid fever 
and intracranial lesions of vascular origin each represented between 2,000 
and 3,999 deaths. Diseases of pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium, 
dysentery, homicide and typhus each represented between 1,000 and 1,999 
deaths. Certain other diseases, such as syphilis, smallpox and diphtheria 
represented fewer than 1,000 deaths each. 29,492 (about 18 per cent) of total 
deaths had unknown or unspecified causes.151 A high proportion of deaths 
was attributed to causes amenable to known methods of control: intestinal 
diseases, dysentery, malaria and acute infectious disease, like whooping 
cough and measles. Table One shows the incidence of selected illnesses in 
1948 in Colombia for 209 municipalities which reported to the hygiene 
ministry (out of 815); these 209 represented approximately 5,420,010 
persons in an estimated total population for that year of 10,998,920. 
In 1944 a technically proficient yellow fever service was established, fifty 
per cent funded from national sources, fifty per cent by the Rockefeller 
Foundation. The case for a comparable malaria service was established, with 
over 52,000 cases diagnosed in 1944. The budget assigned to combat 
tuberculosis had expanded significantly since the mid-1930s, but was still 
estimated to be only one-tenth of that needed. However, the inference can be 
drawn that the positive value of many public health measures, for example 
those resolutions of 1920 which outlined 'petrolisation' practices in mosquito-
breeding pools and prophylactic measures to counter typhus and typhoid 
fever, remained more educational than directly enforceable in the late 
1940s.152 
The Carlos Finlay Institute founded in 1935 assumed the main 
responsibility for action to counter yellow fever. Its laboratory produced the 
vaccine against yellow fever that was used in a ten year campaign of mass 
immunisation beginning in 1937 during which 1,120,000 persons were 
immunised, in spite of breakdowns of equipment that was difficult to replace 
during the Second World War. All military personnel, oil workers and 
prisoners were vaccinated. Vaccine was also exported by air to nine 
neighbouring countries. No cases of urban yellow fever were diagnosed after 
the Institute was established; but a risk of epidemic remained in the late 
1940s because most towns were inflected with the mosquito Aedes aegypti 
which contains the reservoir of infection and transmits it transovarially 
through infected eggs.153 
The malaria position was uneven. In 1947 it was reported in Cali that 
malaria was now effectively controlled; its incidence in Cartagena had been 
reduced by the introduction of cement channels; in Barranquilla mosquito 
breeding-grounds had been controlled by paving and channelling the Rebelo 
water-course, and Magoon traps (named after the US Governor of occupied 
Cuba) had been successfully used. DDT fumigation was proceeding in one 
suburb of Santa Marta and on the outskirts of the city; and a fall in the 
incidence of the disease was registered in La Dorada and Puerto Salgar 
thanks to new engineering works. In Medellin a new anti-malaria works 
project had been signed between the city and the SCISP (Servicio 
Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Publica); and a high incidence of 
malaria was registered on the Ferrocarril de Antioquia near Puerto Berrio. 
In Buenaventura studies of one anopheles were proceeding to define whether 
or not it was a vector of malaria.154 Yet by 1950 there was cause for 
considerable disquiet regarding malaria. Programmes of control were 
obstructed by shortages of trained personnel and even of funds to import 
insecticides and drugs. The geographical coverage of departmental 
programmes was too restricted to bring about an effective reduction in 
national malaria incidence. Doubts were expressed as to whether it was 
practicable to eliminate mosquito breeding-places outside the cities through 
drainage and land-filling projects. One alternative - the use of newer drugs 
possessing suppressive and curative properties - was giving encouraging 
results in experimental areas. DDT was also being used. 
Although tuberculosis mortality statistics were not especially impressive 
(3,966 deaths through pulmonary disease, 514 caused by other diseases in 
1948), well-substantiated medical evidence combined with the everyday 
experience of physicians suggested otherwise. Between 1944 and 1948 about 
1,350,000 persons were examined, usually with the help of X-rays, among 
whom 51,000 new cases of tuberculosis were found and 80 required active 
treatment. However, isolation continued to be the main feature of hospital 
treatment for tuberculosis, so that according to an ICSS survey, over one-half 
of patients died in hospital. The tuberculosis hospital of Medellin was almost 
a fortress, where patients - textile-workers, jewellery-makers, and other 
artisans - were subject to a system of reclusion, because tuberculosis 
remained taboo and its victims were the objects of fear.155 Imperfect data 
for pulmonary tuberculosis in Colombia demonstrated mortality rates of 10-
25 deaths per 10,000 persons; and morbidity studies conducted in Medellfn 
indicated especially high rates among children (12.3 per cent positive) and 
minors (41.5 per cent positive). The beginnings of mass-screening and case-
finding gave grounds for cautious optimism. And a national expansion in the 
diagnosis, treatment and prophylaxis of tuberculosis was occurring despite 
problems at local level. A decline in the tuberculosis services of Cucuta and 
Bucaramanga was caused by breakdowns in radiodiagnostic equipment and 
difficulties in obtaining spare parts; and the virtual closure of the service in 
Ocana (Norte de Santander) was caused by the resignation of doctors and 
difficulties in replacing them due to poor remuneration. The drive to arouse 
public consciousness of the dangers posed by tuberculosis met with some 
response in the establishment of a model school for child victims and special 
wards for children and adults in two Bogota hospitals. But whereas public 
opinion had a probably exaggerated fear of the risks posed by leprosy for 
which the case for the segregation of patients was not proven, the risks posed 
by tuberculosis - pulmonary and extra-pulmonary - were underappreciated, 
so that insufficient funding, either philanthropic or official, was available to 
build a tuberculosis hospital. 
By the 1930s the framework was set for investigations with modest 
resources into immediate disease problems, conducted by a senior professor 
accompanied by a junior researcher, who, in the absence of laboratory 
assistants, did the essential microscope work together. Luis Patino Camargo, 
who researched into the mosquito vectors that transmitted diseases, gave an 
essential impetus to an emphasis upon the home and occupational 
environment of the ill person to complement the hospital and laboratory-
based traditions; and he contributed significantly towards shaping an 
intellectual environment where public health as a study could acquire 
impetus. Patino Camargo invited one recent graduate, Hernando Groot, to 
join him in studying an unidentified disease that was rampant in the south-
west in 1939-40. The disease was established to be bartonnellosis (verruga 
peruana); and Groot was left in Pasto by Patino to continue the study 
alone.156 
One brilliant career, that of Jorge Boshell Manrique, illustrates some 
broader trends in the relationships of public health, external influences and 
research into tropical diseases. Having taken his first degree at Lausanne in 
Switzerland, Boshell specialised in hygiene and tropical illnesses in Brussels 
between 1928 and 1930, beginning his career as a doctor employed by a 
diamond mine in the Belgian Congo. At 28 Boshell established himself in 
Villavicencio with the aim of undertaking research into tropical diseases in 
the Llanos Orientales and jungle regions; and in 1934 he made his first 
diagnoses of jungle yellow fever, isolating the virus in 1935. 
Table 1 
Incidence of Selected Reported Illnesses in Colombia, 1948 
Disease Number of Cases Rate per 100,000 
Total 504,618 
Malaria 89,727 1,655 
Influenza 75,756 1,398 
Intestinal Parasites 72,421 1,336 
Hookworm Infestation 40,228 742 
Amoebic Dysentery 38,395 708 
Gonorrhoea 29,614 960 
Syphilis 27,158 501 
Whooping Cough 20,057 859 
Typhoid and Paratyphoid Fever 11,207 207 
Measles 11,169 478 
Scabies 10,273 189 
Tuberculosis of the Lungs 8,667 160 
Pneumonia 8,599 158 
Chancroid 7,802 253 
Smallpox 7,356 71 
Diarrhoea and Enteritis (under 2 yrs) 6,875 1,459 
Erysipelas 5,255 97 
Mycosis 3,883 71 
Typhus 3,471 90 
Pinta 3,395 62 
Relapsing Fever 3,085 57 
Chickenpox 2,954 54 
Mumps 2,790 51 
Yaws 2,357 43 
Diphtheria 2,238 96 
Impetigo Contagioso 2,126 39 
Opthalmia Purulent 1,940 36 
Lymphogranuloma 1,517 49 
Granuloma Inguinale 822 27 
Puerperal Fever 813 77 
Infectious Hepatitis 640 12 
Bacillary Dysentery 445 8 
Tuberculosis (other forms) 416 7 
Tetanus Infantile 301 171 
Rubella 287 13 
Leishmaniasis 270 5 
Dengue 95 2 
Poliomyelitis 67 3 
Filariasis 59 1 
Epidemic Meningitis 24 0.4 
Bartonellosis 25 0.5 
Scarlet Fever 23 0.4 
Trichinosis 12 0.2 
Undulant Fever 4 0.07 
Source: IBRD, The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia (Baltimore, 
1952), Table 52 
In 1940 Boshell found the mosquito transmitting yellow fever in the Llanos 
Orientales, and in 1946 captured the insect in the selva. He also went to La 
Goajira and the Pacific coast of Choco to study the characteristics of malaria 
in the early 1940s; and he studied beriberi among Colombian troops in the 
frontier river-port of Leticia. Winning international recognition, Boshell 
obtained Rockefeller support for laboratory development, taught courses 
about yellow fever in Brazil, and studied it in the Andean highlands of north-
west Argentina. He returned to Colombia in 1947-9 as director of the 
Instituto Samper Martinez, subsequently working at the Escuela Superior de 
Higiene. 
Towards a Modern Social Security System? 
Social security in Colombia had its roots among the military. Montepios 
militares, military charitable funds to protect the widows and orphans of 
soldiers, had been founded in 1827 by Bolivar; and the need for labour law 
and social security, with an emphasis upon the bereaved of the civil wars, 
was underlined by the Liberal caudillo General Rafael Uribe in 1904. 
However, despite the pressure of the International Labour Office to adopt 
legally binding international labour standards in such areas as the protection 
of the life and health of workers and the prevention of work hazards, 
Colombia was a Latin American latecomer to social security provision.157 
Three legislative projects had been introduced between 1926 and 1930. The 
first sought to establish a Caja de Seguros de Trabajo that would cover 
maternity care and risks of invalidity, old age, illness and death for all wage 
workers. The second aimed to create a system of cash benefits for work-
related disabilities. The third revived the main features of the first project. 
All were shelved. 
The same fate befell a series of similar projects between 1935 and 1941, 
only one of which became law; but this never came into force, and was 
suspended by a subsequent law. Out of the legislative projects of the 1930s 
emerged only a modest patchwork of provision that was financed entirely by 
employers. Coverage embraced only a very small proportion of the working 
population, and those covered tended to belong to middle-income groups, 
mainly public sector employees. For this minority provision was 
comprehensive, covering particular contingencies and more general 
questions, and embracing severance pay and paid vacations, as well as old 
age, occupational illness and accident benefits.158 Only in 1944-5 were 
there moves to enlarge the system of protection and coverage, to impose 
broad responsibilities on employers and to generalise a system of 
contributions.159 Law 90 of 1946 established the Colombian Institute of 
Social Security (ICSS), supplemented by the Caja Nacional de Prevision for 
official employees. It was intended that the ICSS should administer an 
ambitious programme which combined health, maternity, disability, work 
accident, occupational illness and retirement insurance, but which excluded 
unemployment insurance and relief for low-income groups. It was envisaged 
that many functions previously covered by company welfare services, the 
Beneficencias and ad hoc budgetary welfare allocations would be taken over 
gradually by the ICSS, a quasi-public body intended to operate free of 
political pressures, whose management contained representatives of the 
national government, the medical professions, and affiliated employers and 
workers. The aim was to establish, with Brazilian advice, a bold programme, 
but to proceed slowly, launching the Institute after four years preparation. 
The first ICSS services were confined to some 50,000 workers in Bogota and 
its environs, and were financed by imposing a tax equivalent to eight per cent 
of the payroll to which the employer paid four per cent, the employee two per 
cent and the government two per cent. By June 1950 90,000 workers were 
covered. 
The initiative in Bogota was followed by feasibility studies in Medellin. A 
directory of enterprises indicated a potential of over 7,000 affiliated 
enterprises in Medellin and its satellite towns, and a census indicated over 
65,000 potential affiliated workers. A maternity clinic was purchased, which, 
in keeping with the Social Catholic thrust of the ICSS in Medellin, was 
renamed the Clinica Leon XIII. A central dispensary was established, and 
consultancy rooms were opened in the manufacturing centres of the Valle de 
Aburra. In 1950 a Caja Seccional was founded too for the Quindio and 
northern Valle del Cauca, that had the significantly different function of 
reaching out to far-flung coffee-producing municipalities. 
From its inception the ICSS confronted acute problems. There was 
resistance from some medical practitioners, who, fearing both a threat to 
their livelihood and a loss of independence, expressed concern that, as state 
employees with standardised hours and pay, they would be unable to define 
their own jobs, be denied the liberty to fix their own fees and be subject to 
administrative decisions that curbed their clinical independence. Financial 
problems, outstanding among them the failure of the state to pay the 
contributions laid down by Law 90 and also delays in payment by affiliated 
enterprises and workers, were exacerbated by accountancy difficulties - the 
absence of clear budgets outlining income and expenditure and of an auditing 
office. To increase medical benefits hospital facilities controlled by the ICSS 
were needed; and it was calculated that the cost of new hospitals would be 
defrayed by using a large part of the excess of contributions over payments 
in the old age insurance programme during the early years of the scheme. 
Yet, as early as 1956, this was to prove a miscalculation: the building of a 
new clinic in Bogota, that was intended as a symbol of ICSS success, had to 
be halted. 
Political problems also beset the ICSS. It is unclear how far urban unrest 
and the bogotazo, coupled with astonishingly high levels of turnover in public 
office, influenced the ICSS programme. There was the possibility that its 
implementation was speeded up, because the exponents of Social Security 
provision used the socio-political upheaval to argue that instability would be 
alleviated by granting organised labour an expanded stake within the status 
quo. However, it seems likely that the impact of processes accelerating 
change was outweighed by that of factors decelerating it. Managerial 
confidence was dented by uncertainty about the financial viability of the 
Social Security programme and by the difficulties encountered in maintaining 
records for the covered population that arose from a scarcity of competent 
accountants and statisticians. Inadequate population data, the unjustified 
assumption of a currency with stable purchasing power, continuing infighting 
about levels of contributions and divisions within the ruling Conservative 
party aggravated uncertainties further. The authoritarian laureanista faction, 
which came to power in 1950, suspected all worker representation, even 
Catholic trade unions, as evidence of subversion. The Gomez-Urdaneta 
administration (1950-3) perceived the branch of the ICSS in Medellin as part 
of the power-base of the more conciliatory ospinista Conservative faction and 
the branch in Bogota as a means by which the ospinista faction hoped to build 
support among bogotano organised labour before the 1954 presidential 
campaign. Thus conditions were hardly auspicious for the ICSS. There was 
no drive to dismantle it altogether but it received little encouragement to 
expand its activities.160 A sectional office in Cali was closed immediately 
after its inauguration owing to funding difficulties. The accomplishments of 
the ICSS in its early years were modest: among them were some of the first 
scholarships for training in social security and hospital administration, a 
drive to raise levels of domestic hygiene, and the first work on bio-statistics, 
especially patterns of mortality and morbidity, among affiliated workers. 
Perhaps the most important achievement consisted of the first steps towards 
a programme for the prevention of occupational risks.161 
The foundation of the ICSS was probably mistimed and its structure and 
organisation misconceived. The ICSS was beset by problems of financial 
stringency, conceptual weakness - a model hastily borrowed from Mexico 
with insufficient concern for Colombian conditions - and political 
expediency. The notion of a disinterested management presiding over a quasi-
public body free of partisan political interference was Utopian in the years of 
polarisation between 1948 and 1958. Furthermore, an initiative of the 
dimensions of the ICSS required powerful backing from the state which the 
chronically unstable Ospina Perez government could not provide and that was 
anathema to large parts of the right-wing Gomez-Urdaneta administration. 
Initially the ICSS won widespread employer support. Ideologically, there was 
some appeal in Social Security arrangements where benefits were a matter of 
contract rather than charity and thus were compatible with a stance of 
economic individualism. The ICSS won the endorsement of the industrialist 
pressure group (Asociacion Nacional de Industrials - ANDI) , on the 
grounds that it was in the interests of the manufacturing sector to have a more 
healthy workforce. There was also the less highminded attraction of 
offloading some of the costs of social security provision onto the state, but 
this wore off when the state failed to comply with its statutory contributions. 
Some entrepreneurs preferred company provision, not least because they 
controlled its range, cost and quality directly. Thirty-six Antioqueno 
enterprises, including the largest textile firm Coltejer, had already by 1950 
sought exemptions; and now the ANDI shifted its position, claiming that the 
ICSS made more demands of manufacturing industry than it could meet and 
that the powers of the ICSS manager were excessive.162 
Social security provision needed the active support of departmental 
government, which was notably unforthcoming in Valle del Cauca, crucial 
as a region containing a fast-growing manufacturing base in Cali linked to an 
increasingly powerful agribusiness sector - especially in sugar-cane - and 
about to embark on a major hydroelectricity project. Support from the trade 
union confederations was also essential; but one, the Confederation de 
Trabaj adores Colombianos (CTC) was being dismantled both physically and 
juridically, and its members, especially bogotanos of gaitanista leanings 
distrusted the initiative as a palliative from an alien government desperate for 
electoral support in the large cities rather than as a victory for worker 
militancy. The other, the Union de Trabaj adores Colombianos (UTC), lacked 
credibility and a following among large parts of the organised workforce 
except in Medellin. Arguably the ICSS diverted scarce personnel from 
improvements in public health and preventive medicine that had benefits for 
the population as a whole to provision for a minority with some ability to pay 
on a contributory basis. 
Health Care at mid-Century 
By 1950 health policy had some clarity of purpose, only intermittently 
evident in the inter-war decades. It was broadly accepted that the public 
health structure should be strengthened and measures to prevent disease 
fortified; that more health professionals should be recruited and employed; 
that environmental health, especially the construction of such sanitation 
facilities as water purification and waste disposal systems, should be given 
high priority; and that the system of hospitals and, imprecisely defined, the 
broader public welfare system should be enhanced. There was a general 
consensus that the hygiene ministry should operate some national institutions, 
and should undertake direct campaigns against yaws, for example, which 
gave it an impact in some outlying parts of Colombia, like Choco, where 
other ministries had none. But otherwise, it should aim only at assuming 
broad areas of responsibility like the issuing of regulations and setting of 
standards, the distribution of funds and the provision of consultants, and 
information-gathering. Policy should aim at devolving the greatest possible 
measure of administrative and financial responsibility to the departments and 
municipalities. At the same time, innovation should not be overstressed. It 
was more important to make a health care system that was functioning 
inadequately, especially with regard to food precautions - meat inspection, 
milk pasteurisation and the refrigeration of meat, fish and dairy products -
work better. Private initiative was to be welcomed where it complemented 
public policy, as for example, in hospitalisation for tuberculosis.163 
In 1950 there was some cause for cautious optimism in Colombia about 
health care. The gradual recovery of the economy and the permanence of that 
recovery at least meant that few initiatives were abandoned for lack of 
finance. The Colombian health status compared favourably with that of 
Venezuela and Ecuador. The hygiene ministry had some successes to its 
credit; and, even if its functions were more normative, advisory and technical 
than operative, its performance gained more respect than that of the other 
new post-war ministry, the ministry of justice. The ICSS, greeted with more 
caution than the ministry of hygiene, had yet to prove itself. More than just 
a piece of rhetoric, the first national hospital plan of 1950 was an attempt to 
turn haphazard into systematic arrangements. For the first time, in the report 
made by the World Bank Mission headed by Lauchlin Currie, the health care 
sector experienced a coherent attempt to analyse current conditions, forecast 
future needs and allocate resources rationally. The World Bank Mission 
reported a growing awareness of poor health as a drain on resources and one 
reason for failure to reach maximum productivity, and of inadequate nutrition 
as a factor debilitating the labour force. 
Another source of optimism was the relative freedom of health care from 
the polarisation of Conservatives and Liberals that divided Colombia. Why 
was this? The reorganisation of health care did not jeopardise the position of 
the ruling elite, and thus concessions to the principle of equity were more 
readily made than in, for example, agriculture. There were memories of 
disinterested medical practitioners in the War of the Thousand Days (1899-
1902) who had served the wounded of both sides and for whom the 
conservation of life was more important than partisan commitment. Most 
professional leaders attached more significance in the late 1940s and 1950s 
to long-term health improvements than to day-to-day politics and professional 
friendships built across the partisan divide survived la violencia. External 
funding of essential campaigns against endemic and recurring diseases played 
a role too: projects containing an element of foreign funding were for the 
most part free from politicisation because external donors would not 
countenance the partisan selection of personnel. (The anti-malaria campaign 
was exceptional, but only briefly in 1952.) Perhaps too the shortage of 
medical practitioners played a part. Whereas lawyers abounded in the small 
towns where la violencia, thrived and competed for business and government 
positions, medical practitioners were in short supply and could afford to be 
politically aloof. Indeed, the position in health care ran contrary to Paul 
Oquist's influential thesis that the partial collapse of the Colombian state 
constituted the main explanatory cause of la violencia. Oquist's emphasis on 
the military, policing and judicial functions of the state overlooked vital 
questions of its presence and efficacy in areas of hygiene, primary education 
and public works.164 
The international context was favourable too. The Second World War had 
aroused an urgent interest in subjects like traumatisms and aviation medicine, 
and had given an impetus to the modernisation of nursing education and 
practice. Western countries, alert both to their failures in social policy after 
the First World War and the emphasis laid upon social experiment by the 
Soviet Union, placed health care at the heart of welfare state experiments at 
home; and the foundation of the World Health Organisation and its 
proclamation of 'enjoyment of the highest standards of health' in 1948 placed 
health care more centrally on the international agenda than before. In his 
Fourth Point, President Harry Truman attributed poverty in South America 
to poor living conditions and an insufficient labour supply; and his 
government set the pattern of exporting missions to Colombia to advise on 
community health issues. Public health was establishing itself as a recognised 
specialism. In the late 1940s the first Colombians went abroad to study it, at 
for example the Escuela de Salubridad y Higiene in Mexico City;165 and in 
the early 1950s the Rockefeller Foundation helped to fund a new National 
School of Public Health in Medellin. A trickle of postgraduates studying in 
Britain was influenced by the example of the National Health Service set up 
by the Labour administration of Clement Attlee. Social democratic arguments 
that government had an obligation to provide primary health care and to 
resolve such financial problems as the cost of expensive artificial limbs for 
the war-wounded had some purchase. Beveridgian, like Keynesian, ideas 
were, indeed, to have an enduring impact.166 
New medical technology, especially penicillin, played a valuable role. 
Young doctors went out to the countryside to prove the positive qualities of 
penicillin, which they hoped would eradicate yaws among 1.5 million 
Colombians who inhabited the Pacific littoral from Ecuador to Panama. 
Diagnosis was simple, barely requiring medical competence; and once the 
first laboratory tests demonstrated the efficacy of the new drug, the 
campaign, conducted by sea and river in the absence of roads and railways, 
was, with Ecuadorian collaboration, underway. At the same time some 
aspects of the wartime experiences of the British and US armed forces had 
Colombian application: for example, in the treatment of hepatitis among 
patients sent to Bogota from the oil-producing zone of Casabe, west of 
Barrancabermeja.167 The efficacy of public health policy was restricted by 
budgeting. Leprosy - not an epidemiological^ significant disease - still 
represented in 1949 over one-quarter of the budget of the hygiene ministry. 
This was spent on a programme of leprosy control, especially three leprosaria 
where infected persons were segregated, and the care by the ministry of the 
children of leprous parents. Local surveys conducted in 1938 had indicated 
about 17,000 persons suffering from leprosy; and the director of the national 
leprosy programme believed that ten years or so later the number of leprous 
persons was increasing more slowly than the population as a whole. The 
World Bank mission argued that the assignment of so large a portion of the 
national health budget to one disease that constituted only a small fraction of 
the total burden of illness was unjustified.168 Progressive legislation, 
influenced by unfavourable comparison with the quality of treatment at 
sanatoria in Sao Paulo and Argentina, was introduced in 1945 and 1947. This 
sought to break with traditions of concealing lepers and thus perpetuating 
leprosy and of giving the poor a treatment distinct from that of the 
prosperous, and won the praise of the World Health Organisation. But the 
new legislation was not acted upon, for lack of resources. Instead, an 
antileprosy campaign that was admitted officially to be anachronistic and 
inefficacious survived, venerated for its age and reliant on the generosity and 
disinterest of religious orders and state functionaries. The definitive 
abandonment of the idea of regional sanatoria coincided with the completion 
of a new building for the leper colony at Agua de Dios that was acquired by 
a private philanthropist and the Congregation de Sagrados Corazones. Thus, 
in the absence of genuine official initiative, philanthropic endeavour 
perpetuated anomalous treatment.169 Public anxiety about leprosy was 
heightened by a mass flight of lepers to obtain improved rations, followed by 
protests by lepers against managerial changes. Unrest within the leper 
colonies, caused by inflated prices of essential goods, high levels of alcohol 
consumption, inadequate sanitation and infestation of their homes, had a 
resonance among adjacent populations. Proposals of the central government 
to open a new leper colony on the borders of Santander and Boyaca, the two 
departments of highest leprosy rates, had met with alarm in the mid-
19408.170 Only in the early 1950s were traditions of total confinement 
relaxed, in line with better knowledge of the epidemiology of leprosy and the 
risks of contagion.171 
The broader picture was, however, uneven. There were doubts about the 
impact of the PanAmerican Health Organisation, whose budget and influence 
upon policy-makers were growing rapidly. Performing the functions in Latin 
America and the Caribbean that the World Health Organisation undertook in 
Africa and Asia, the PAHO characteristically made a fragmented, primarily 
technical response to health problems. Using the language of public health 
programmes the PAHO selected a particular disease as a realistic target for 
eradication and concentrated its activities on narrowly conceived campaigns 
to achieve that goal, but failed to stress broader strategies to improve the 
living and working material conditions of poor populations or to devote 
material and human resources to them.172 
In Colombia a mosaic of modest welfare institutions and uncoordinated 
departmental initiatives which drew upon public funding was not effectively 
audited and brought about improvements that were not always sustained.173 
The effectiveness of the ministry of hygiene was vitiated by under-funding; 
by discontinuous financing as policy priorities shifted or recession 
precipitated retrenchment in social spending; and by a high turnover of 
personnel caused by factional conflict and poor remuneration. As in the 
1930s private consultancy had the appeal to capable professionals of social 
prestige and better pay combined with a high measure of self-reliance and 
freedom from political interference. Thus the personnel position in health 
care caused misgivings. Since there was no register of health personnel, the 
1951 census figures had to be used by the World Bank mission. These 
indicated 3,327 physicians (i.e. a physician-population ratio of 1: 3,310 in 
Colombia, compared to 1: 730 in the USA in 1949), 1,000 graduate dentists 
and 600 licensed dentists, 400 general nurses, 200 nurse-midwives and 200 
health visitors. Public health services were weakened by personnel problems: 
the lack of public health specialists with a systematic and standardised 
training that included supervised field training, apprenticeships and residency 
that was formally planned and budgeted and used to positive effect to enhance 
the quality and number of personnel. There was an awareness of problems in 
general terms - the need for a pure water supply and milk pasteurisation, for 
example - but there were not the qualified personnel to attend to them.174 
Turnover of personnel thwarted effective public health administration. One 
city health officer stated that during one year the equivalent of two-thirds of 
the staff changed approximately every four months. It was claimed too that 
50-55 per cent of the employees of the ministry of hygiene were replaced in 
1948. The fear of arbitrary dismissal among qualified personnel meant that 
they opted for the private sector. The position in sanitary engineering was 
especially bad: frequent turnover of undereducated personnel obstructed the 
formation of an adequate professional staff. At the same time the profession 
of social worker existed only in embryo. The Currie Mission recommended 
a shift from an institutional to a fieldwork approach to social work and a 
programme of home-care and the mobilisation of community resources. 
Formal training and recruitment patterns and career structures were needed 
for social workers, along with systems of tenure and promotion on merit.175 
Public health was the junior partner of private medicine. Daniel Pecaut has 
argued persuasively that continuity in the liberal development model in 
Colombia made for a high degree of autonomy of the producer associations 
as well as a profound disorganisation of the popular sectors.176 The high 
level of autonomy enjoyed also by the liberal professions was evident in 
priorities regarding public health. The number of physicians who specialised 
in public health was small, and even recent graduates were discouraged 
because salaries were low for public employees and prospects were poor. 
There were no clear career structures, poor conditions of recruitment and 
service, little executive authority and no security of tenure. Meanwhile, many 
physicians were untrained in the most serious problem of many locations, 
namely sanitation, and were concerned with clinical cases rather than 
prevention and immunisation. Every doctor needed some training in 
epidemiology, vital statistics, personal hygiene, industrial, educational and 
mental hygiene, sanitary engineering and the protection of mothers and 
infants.177 But the Colombian medical profession, culturally bound by 
private practice, was, like the English medical profession a century before, 
ambivalent to public health, relegating it to a secondary priority and showing 
a general indifference to preventive, occupational and environmental 
medicine.178 Furthermore, it is unclear how far new administrative 
structures and attitudes in public health acted in such a way as to ameliorate 
conditions for the poor and how far to reinforce middle-class fears of poverty 
and dirt and demands for patterns of residential segregation by social class 
as cities grew, thus isolating and perpetuating patterns of urban poverty.179 
A shortage of public health personnel was compounded by a poor record 
in public health practice. Legislation in 1948 (Ley 49 de 1948) created a 
national emergency relief agency, and handed the responsibility for its 
administration to the Red Cross, but did not provide funds. Only minimum 
measures for food protection had been taken by the end of the 1940s. Success 
with milk pasteurisation measures was limited by equipment of obsolete 
design and in poor repair that was probably poorly operated. The water 
supply position was especially dismal. Contaminated water had been 
responsible for over 1,000 recorded cases of typhoid per annum in Medellin 
between 1943 and 1948, with a further 1,282 recorded in the first five months 
of 1949. Conditions in public markets were poor: food was not protected 
from insect and human contamination; and there was a high spoilage rate 
which had adverse consequences for peasant incomes. Refrigeration of meat 
was hardly known in the slaughter-houses. 
The inefficacy of public health policy was exemplified by a failure to curb 
venereal diseases in spite of heavy publicity in the large cities since the 
1920s. Many sufferers were identified as having the disease only when they 
entered public hospitals for treatment of other illnesses or when they received 
physical examinations to obtain work certificates. The anti-VD campaign had 
three main features: prophylactic posts, several of which had been unable to 
complete the treatment of patients in 1944-5 because they ran out of drugs; 
public campaigns which ran into difficulties because paper was scarce during 
the Second World War and propaganda films could not be obtained;180 and 
the registration, licensing, examination and treatment of prostitutes, which 
did not function as intended. Of 9,703 'public women' examined in a sample 
study, 8,349 were found to have gonorrhoea, and many had multiple 
infections - combinations of gonorrhoea, syphilis, chancroid and tropical 
bubo (or lymphogranuloma inguinale). Even in the one city where the 
registration programme was operating well, only 889 of the 1,703 registered 
prostitutes reported regularly to the control clinics. The failure of zones of 
tolerance and regulation of prostitution to contain the spread of venereal 
diseases provided a context for authoritarian measures against prostitutes in 
Bogota as part of the right-wing offensive after the bogotazo. In 1951 the 
Academia Nacional de Medicina gave its formal support to attempts to 
suppress prostitution (outside Bogota it was still tolerated) on medical, moral 
and religious grounds and in order to defend the women of the 'economically 
and educationally weak classes'.181 One cause for optimism with regard to 
syphilis in the early 1950s lay in the application of penicillin. (Gonorrhoea, 
however, could develop strains resistant to penicillin.) In other respects, 
there was less cause for optimism as moral fervour blurred policy. 
The national mortality picture was grim. A high proportion of deaths was 
attributable to causes that were amenable to known methods of control: 
malaria, intestinal infections (diarrhoea, enteritis, typhoid and paratyphoid 
fevers, dysentery) and acute infectious diseases (whooping cough, measles). 
Childbirth was especially hazardous, and infants were notoriously vulnerable 
to deaths from intestinal disorders. (Although tropical anaemia was often 
diagnosed, it was only a manifestation of heavy parasitic infestation.) Official 
statistics, reporting a high incidence of malaria, intestinal parasites, anaemic 
dysentery and diarrhoeal disorders were, the Currie Mission reported, 
confirmed by impressionistic field observations by physicians. Indeed, one 
obstacle to economic growth consisted of the high incidence of disease 
preventable by immunisation (smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough). 
Additionally, growth was impeded by, and limited resources squandered 
upon, recurring conditions, especially yaws, pinta and typhus fever. Albert 
Berry and Miguel Urrutia indicate a pattern of increasingly unequal income 
distribution between about 1930 and the early 1950s, with rural labour and 
urban construction workers suffering a stagnant or deteriorating position 
while that of government employees and manufacturing workers improved. 
Furthermore, between 1945 and 1953 wages for white-collar workers in 
manufacturing rose at twice the rate of blue-collar workers. If, as this 
preliminary analysis suggests, the groups enjoying an improved income 
tended to have greater access to social policy provision and the groups 
suffering a stagnant or deteriorating income were excluded from official 
provision, then the overall gap in the quality of life between the included and 
the excluded was broadening significantly, and official health care was doing 
precious little to assist the groups in greatest need.182 
The pattern of operation of public health was not uniform. In four 
departments - Boyaca, Narino, Santander and Tolima - the ministry operated 
all public health services directly; formerly these, as in all other departments, 
were autonomous. The ministry allocated specific sums to particular areas, 
some distributed as grants, some under contracts, and others used to defray 
in part the costs of services that the ministry provided in lieu of funds. 
Similar arrangements prevailed for special programmes organised by the 
ministry, for example, to control malaria, tuberculosis and venereal diseases, 
along with maternal and child health care. Whereas in the mid-1940s the 
SCISP provided external funds that were then matched by Colombian funds, 
by 1950 the responsibility for financial support and management was passed 
to the hygiene ministry and local institutions as the national economy grew. 
Rockefeller assistance had facilitated other work. Matching arrangements had 
financed yellow fever campaigns; the Carlos Finlay Institute in Bogota and 
the Roberto Franco Institute in Villavicencio (where laboratory research was 
conducted in an environment close to the field), had been built largely with 
Rockefeller funds, but by 1950 were supported almost entirely by the 
ministry. And Rockefeller endeavour had shifted elsewhere; it had provided 
some aid to the National Nursing School, and was now supporting the 
National School of Public Health, a co-operative venture designed to rectify 
the acknowledged lacuna of training of both physicians specialising in public 
health and laboratory technicians. 
Effective public health organisation was impaired by the absence of 
working arrangements between the national, departmental and municipal 
health authorities and also the beneficencias. What co-ordination existed 
occurred as a result of such devices as interlocking budgets, the sharing of 
personnel and premises, the cross-referral of clienteles and overlapping 
membership on directing boards and advisory councils. Beneficencia de 
caridad arrangements were the products of elaborate legal compromises 
reached after conflicts between the secular authorities and the religious orders 
over the ownership of hospitals and the control of their incomes and 
endowments. The scope for conflict was considerable. In the 1930s and 1940s 
it was increasingly clear that notions of charity underpinning the concept of 
beneficencia were at odds with concepts of social welfare that included a 
right to medical aid which the state provides through tax collection. Public 
lotteries, supplemented by earmarked taxes usually on beneficencia income, 
were the main source of income. While the government set the general 
pattern of regulation, administrative authority was vested in a committee 
representing the ministry, department, civil and professional interests, and 
usually the diocese. In Cundinamarca beneficencia spending was allocated to 
institutions - hospitals and custodial institutions - and also as direct relief for 
children supported in orphanages, most of whom received primary schooling 
and vocational training and some of whom received scholarships to attend 
secondary schools. The deficiencies of beneficencia institutions were 
numerous: the age and size of buildings; overcrowding, especially in mental 
hospitals and orphanages; and ill-trained staff barely capable of providing 
active therapy in mental hospitals. A system of financing whose yield was 
unpredictable exacerbated difficulties, making in particular for frequent 
delays in the completion of hospitals and other buildings and in equipping 
them.183 Charity boards were reluctant to change established practices and 
hesitant to devolve to the state a range of benefactions for the poor, partly 
from an instinctive resistance to change arising from a reluctance to lose 
opportunities for displays of disinterested benevolence which won social 
esteem,184 and also from scepticism about state competence that would have 
been more justified if their own competence had not been sorely in doubt. 
The hygiene centre movement in the cities had acquired some momentum 
since the mid-1930s. But owing to weak municipal administration and poor 
staffing and premises, many hygiene centres were closed by the mid-1940s, 
with the itinerant departmental health service as the only substitute in small 
municipalities. Some attempts at reviving the centres under municipal or joint 
municipal-beneficencia management were commencing after the Second 
World War. But there was no uniformity: some centres were multi-purpose, 
others had a single aim, like child health. In 1949 legislation to reinvigorate 
the system of hygiene centres laid down that in towns of under 20,000 
inhabitants the minimum service should consist of a health post, manned by 
a physician, an auxiliary nurse, a public hygiene visitor and a hygiene 
inspector. In towns where a hospital existed a health centre had the functions 
of co-ordinating health posts with hospitals and with specialist hygiene 
services. The centres were to be manned by two doctors, one dentist, two 
public hygiene visitors, one laboratory assistant and one inspector of 
hygiene.185 The fragility of the system of hygiene centres meant a 
continuing heavy reliance on hospitals even for minor ailments. 
The hospital system was haphazard and fragmented. A survey by the ICSS 
in 1947 found that of 253 hospitals, 125 were equipped for surgery, 153 
contained maternity wards, 63 had a laboratory and 22 had X-ray facilities. 
Of 20,200 beds recorded, no more than 10,000 at an optimistic estimate met 
reasonable standards for active hospital care. While high-income groups used 
26 private hospitals and twelve enterprises ran hospitals for the use of their 
own employees, the remainder of the population depended on public and 
charity hospitals (the charity hospitals, despite their name, being supported 
in part by fees paid by or on behalf of patients). The gravity of administrative 
problems was exemplified by the 1,500-bed departmental hospital in Cali 
which once complete remained idle for over two years for lack of furnishings 
and equipment. In 1950 an ambitious hospital programme was proposed by 
which seven hospital service areas would be established and the quality of 
care raised incrementally in seven major urban centres. This scheme met with 
considerable scepticism, given the profound difficulties in maintaining 
existing facilities and incomplete data upon them. Twenty-four hospitals had 
no medical attention in the early 1950s; the fatalistic assumption of the 
hospital as an antesala de muerte was slow to die; and some hospital boards 
resisted the opening of radiology services and pathology laboratories on the 
grounds that they were 'hijos innecesarios en hospitales pobres'. 
Furthermore, rising costs of imported hospital equipment and 
pharmaceuticals distorted budgets. The scene was set for an unresolved 
debate over the relative merits of financing hospitals and health posts. The 
managers of many hospitals argued a prior claim on funding to assist people 
of scarce resources who needed a therapy or diet that the home could not 
provide. The advocates of primary health posts stressed their cost-
effectiveness, their potential for outreach to the community and their superior 
effectiveness in preventive health measures. Medicine was progressing in 
Colombia, but the status of the nation's health was more uncertain. 
Perspectives 
As Colombia entered the second half of the twentieth century, ministers and 
senior officials were confident that Colombian health conditions could 
improve incrementally in line with rising incomes and food consumption, 
increased spending on health care, sanitation and housing, and evidence that 
grassroots action to counter killer diseases had some enduring impact. The 
Gomez administration did not differ from its Liberal predecessors in backing 
a pragmatic blend of private and public initiative in health care. And, 
following the trend set in developed countries and by the international 
agencies, official documents from the hygiene ministry spoke of equity as an 
objective, a concept ruled out of discussion in areas of vital interest to the 
ruling elite, like agriculture, where discussion of equity was seen as 
subversive. The 1950s were to witness the importation and implantation of 
the Flexnerian model in medical education, some significant modernisation 
and expansion of hospital provision and the consolidation of the presence of 
the modern pharmaceutical industry. Some improvements in patient care 
followed the establishment of the first group surgeries in Bogota and the 
application of lessons gained from the experience of treating the casualties of 
la violencia. Each of these changes raised new problems that were to erupt 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Yet at times the proponents of gradualism encountered entrenched interests 
and attitudes that obstructed all change. Dr Juvenal Urbino, one of the 
leading figures in Gabriel Garcia Marquez's Love in the Time of Cholera (El 
amor en los tiempos del colera), could, indeed, have been present in a 
provincial city of the 1950s. Accused of an 'illusory passion' for public 
hygiene and a 'maniacal sense of civic duty', Dr Urbino campaigned for 
aqueduct construction and water purification, strenuous disinfection of homes 
and cleanliness in the market-place. He confronted the inertia of city fathers, 
who proclaimed their proud social origins, 'the historic merits of the city, the 
value of its relics, its heroism, its beauty, but.. .were blind to the decay of the 
years' - attitudes hardly conducive to careful diagnosis and appropriate 
prescription as the demographic crisis of the 1960s loomed. 
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